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RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Daniel J. Solove*
Neil M. Richards**
One of the most important and unresolved quandaries of First
Amendment jurisprudence is the issue of when civil liability for speech will
trigger First Amendment protections.  When speech results in civil liability,
two starkly opposing rules are potentially applicable.  Since New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the First Amendment has required heightened protec-
tion against tort liability for speech, such as defamation and invasion of
privacy.  But in other contexts involving civil liability for speech, the First
Amendment provides virtually no protection.  According to Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., there is no First Amendment scrutiny for speech re-
stricted by promissory estoppel and contract.  The First Amendment rarely
requires scrutiny when property rules limit speech.
Both of these rules are widely accepted.  However, there is a major prob-
lem—in a large range of situations, the rules collide.  Tort, contract, and
property law overlap significantly, so formalistic distinctions between areas of
law will not adequately resolve when the First Amendment should apply to
civil liability.  Surprisingly, few scholars and jurists have recognized or grap-
pled with this problem.
The law of confidentiality vividly illustrates the conflict between the two
rules.  People routinely assume express or implied duties not to disclose an-
other’s personal information.  Does the First Amendment apply to these duties
of confidentiality?  Should it?  More generally, in cases where speech results
in civil liability, which rule should apply, and when?  The law currently
fails to provide a coherent test and rationale for when the Sullivan or
Cohen rule should govern.  In this Article, Professors Daniel J. Solove and
Neil M. Richards contend that the existing doctrine and theories are inade-
quate to resolve this conflict.  They propose a new theory—one that focuses on
the nature of the government power involved.
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INTRODUCTION
“What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel,” the
U.S. Supreme Court declared in 1964 in the watershed case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.1  Today, few would quarrel with the notion that the
First Amendment protects not only against direct government censorship
of speech but also against indirect burdens on speech created by civil
liability more generally.  For a panoply of torts for harms caused by
speech, the well-settled rule is that the First Amendment provides full
1. 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
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protection.  There are, however, many instances where the Supreme
Court applies virtually no First Amendment scrutiny when civil liability
implicates speech.  In particular, many lawsuits involving the enforce-
ment of contracts or property rights do not trigger any significant First
Amendment scrutiny.  Thus, there are two radically different ways that
the First Amendment addresses civil liability involving speech—either full
First Amendment protection or virtually none at all.
Civil liability for speech occurs across vast areas of the legal land-
scape.  There are countless ways in which civil liability implicates free
speech, such as the torts of defamation, invasion of privacy,2 intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and the right of publicity.  Even tort ac-
tions for negligence can be brought in response to a person’s speech.
Numerous contracts restrict speech, such as employment contracts, settle-
ment arrangements, and confidentiality agreements.  Trade secret law
can also restrict speech, as can other forms of intellectual property law.
There are numerous restrictions in condos, cooperatives, and apartment
buildings about when, where, and how residents can display signs or oth-
erwise engage in speech.3
Only a few scholars have examined the legal landscape to determine
where civil liability implicates free speech.  Some have looked at parts of
the landscape, but few have examined it as a whole.4  Stepping back and
looking at the big picture, a major problem emerges:  The two rules for
how the First Amendment applies to civil liability are contradictory, and
in a significant number of circumstances, either rule could conceivably
apply.  Which rule should apply and when?  Surprisingly, the law provides
no compelling or even coherent answer to this question.
Suppose a newspaper obtains the name of a rape victim from a po-
lice report and publishes it.  The rape victim sues the newspaper under
the privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts.  Does the First
Amendment protect the newspaper?  If the story is newsworthy, then the
answer is yes, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Florida Star v. B.J.F.5
According to the Court, “[i]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful infor-
mation about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
2. The four privacy torts are intrusion into seclusion, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and appropriation of name or likeness.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.
L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy].
3. Jim Wasserman, Home Sweet Home Can Sour with Homeowners’ Conflicts, L.A.
Times, July 20, 2003, at B9 (discussing restrictions on political signs).  For other examples
of restrictive covenants, see Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents:  Common
Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 Urb. Law. 335,
336–37 (2005).
4. The most complete treatment of this question, arguing that the First Amendment
applies to virtually all instances of civil liability, is Robert M. O’Neil, The First Amendment
and Civil Liability (2001).  A handful of other scholars have addressed the issue, most only
briefly or in a small cluster of articles written after Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. about
journalism and confidentiality. See infra Part I.C.2.
5. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
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constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order.”6
Now suppose that a rape victim speaks anonymously to a newspaper,
which promises not to publish her name.  The newspaper publishes a
highly newsworthy story about the rape victim, and it decides to break its
promise and reveal her identity.  She sues for promissory estoppel and
breach of implied contract.  Does the First Amendment protect the news-
paper?  The answer is no.  In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme
Court held that even for newsworthy information, a promissory estoppel
claim by a person promised anonymity by a newspaper warrants little to
no First Amendment scrutiny.7
Why do these cases have such different outcomes under the First
Amendment?  Both involve civil liability, free speech, and newsworthy in-
formation.  Yet in the tort case, under what we call the “Sullivan rule,” the
First Amendment applies in full force with strict scrutiny.  In the contract
case, under the “Cohen rule,” the First Amendment provides little to no
scrutiny at all.  Why such a dramatic difference?
The conflict between the Sullivan and Cohen rules is made worse by
the fact that the realms of tort, contract, and property are overlapping
and indistinct.  Tort law is often a vehicle to remedy contract violations.
Grant Gilmore famously observed that tort was swallowing up contract,
and that “contract” as a distinct concept was “being reabsorbed into the
mainstream of ‘tort.’”8  Similarly, tort law frequently remedies property
law violations, such as with the torts of trespass and conversion.  Property
law and contract law also converge; for example, covenants impose re-
strictions on what people can say or do on their land.  Thus, formalistic
distinctions between tort, contract, and property rights will not work as a
way of determining when liability for speech is unconstitutional.
The tension between these two very different First Amendment re-
gimes for civil liability is especially acute in cases involving confidentiality.
The law currently protects confidentiality in many ways.  The breach of
confidentiality tort provides for civil liability when a person owes another
a duty of confidentiality and breaches it.9  Doctors, lawyers, bankers, ac-
countants, and many others have been held liable for disclosing client
confidences.10  Protective orders ensure that information provided in dis-
6. Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
7. See 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (“[E]nforcement of such general laws against the
press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations.”).
8. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 87 (1st ed. 1974).
9. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 157 (2007).
10. Id. at 157–58; see, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290
(Idaho 1961) (holding breach of confidentiality tort applies to banks); Alberts v. Devine,
479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (doctors); Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co.,
87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) (lawyers); Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955,
961 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (accountants).
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covery remains confidential.11  People (especially celebrities) who hire
nannies, servants, personal assistants, real estate agents, and others in-
creasingly use confidentiality agreements to protect their privacy.12  Em-
ployers routinely make employees agree to confidentiality to protect
trade secrets and the personal information of their customers.13  Compa-
nies sharing sensitive information with consultants or other outsiders
often require them to sign nondisclosure agreements.14
Suppose an attorney representing a client in a highly publicized case
discloses the client’s confidential information.  The client sues under the
breach of confidentiality tort.  The attorney claims that she was engaging
in free speech and that the First Amendment protects her right of expres-
sion.  Does the Sullivan or Cohen rule apply?  One could argue that the
Sullivan rule applies because breach of confidentiality is a tort.  On the
other hand, breach of confidentiality remedies a contract-like harm.
Even if never expressed orally or in writing, an implicit agreement exists
between the attorney and client that the attorney will maintain the confi-
dentiality of the client’s information.  Perhaps this situation should fall
under the Cohen rule because the breach of confidentiality claim more
closely resembles an action for promissory estoppel rather than an action
for public disclosure of private facts.  If this were the case, then the First
Amendment would not apply.
In this Article, we argue that First Amendment law’s handling of civil
liability is incoherent.  Although courts and scholars have devoted only
11. See William G. Childs, When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung:  Document Leaks and
Protective Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 Rev. Litig. 565, 565 (2008) (“Protective
orders are commonplace in civil litigation, with trade secrets, privileged communications,
and the like protected from public disclosure.”).
12. See Audrey Davidow, L.A.’s Secret Service, L.A. Times, July 26, 2007, at F1
(discussing how celebrities require “practically everyone working in the home—the
housekeeper, the leaf blower, the bathtub installer” to “sign strict don’t-tell policies”);
Claire Hoffman, Judge OKs Suit by Spelling Alleging Nurse Broke Pact, L.A. Times, Apr.
18, 2006, at C1 (“[S]trict confidentiality agreements . . . are a way of life with celebrities
and high-profile entertainment executives.”); Del Jones, CEOs Shell Out Nearly 6 Figures
to Secure the Perfect Nanny, USA Today, June 30, 2006, at 1B (“Most nannies to CEOs sign
confidentiality agreements never to discuss their families in detail.”); Prashant Gopal, How
the Super-Rich Buy Homes, Bus. Wk. Online, Apr. 14, 2008, at http://www.businessweek.
com/lifestyle/content/apr2008/bw20080410_941624.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing increasing trend of having real estate agents sign nondisclosure
agreements).
13. Thomas J. Rechen, When Loyal Employees Become Traitors, Conn. L. Trib., July
28, 2008, Special Section, at 2 (“The use of non-competes, confidentiality, non-use and
non-disclosure agreements, and trade secrets laws, can help counsel provide necessary
security for the business clients’ most coveted assets . . . .”).
14. Robert E. Kellogg, Getting to Know Nondisclosure Agreements, Daily J. Com.
(Portland, OR), June 13, 2008, at 4 (“Given the potentially high value of confidential
information, business owners are understandably wary about providing such information
to unaffiliated entities without well-defined restrictions on the other party’s use or
disclosure of that information.  The nondisclosure agreement is commonly used to
establish such guidelines.”).
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limited and fragmentary attention to the issue, we have attempted to in-
fer from existing cases and scholarship five approaches for determining
when and how the First Amendment should apply to civil liability:  (1)
the generally applicable law approach, where the First Amendment does not
require scrutiny for civil liability imposed by laws of general applicability;
(2) the consensual waiver approach, where instances in which people con-
sent to relinquishing their right to free speech define the areas where the
First Amendment does not require scrutiny; (3) the nature of the injury
approach, where cases involving damages for reputational harm trigger
full First Amendment protection; (4) the public concern approach, in which
the First Amendment provides full protection when the information is of
public concern; and (5) the First Amendment balancing approach, where all
civil liability implicating free speech would trigger full First Amendment
protection and all cases would be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny.
We contend that each of these approaches is flawed and that none of
them provides a satisfying explanation for when civil liability should im-
plicate the First Amendment.
We argue that there is an alternative way to navigate this vexing is-
sue—one that courts and scholars have thus far overlooked.  Our ap-
proach focuses on government power.  We contend that the First
Amendment should apply to civil liability when government power shapes
the content of public discourse, but not when government power merely
serves as a backstop to private ordering.
In Part I, we discuss the difficult tension in First Amendment doc-
trine that exists when the civil liability system is used to enforce torts,
contracts, or property rules that implicate speech.  The Supreme Court
has established two radically different rules—the Sullivan rule providing
full First Amendment scrutiny and the Cohen rule involving virtually no
First Amendment protection.  We demonstrate that in many circum-
stances, both rules can potentially apply.  In Part II, we examine five ex-
isting approaches for distinguishing between instances where the First
Amendment applies and where it does not.  Although some approaches
have their virtues, none provides a coherent way to determine when or
why the First Amendment should apply to civil liability.  In Part III, we
propose a new theory that looks to the nature of government power in-
volved in various uses of the civil liability system.  We explain why our
theory provides a compelling and coherent way to unscramble the jum-
bled First Amendment jurisprudence and why this approach works while
the alternatives fail.  We then illustrate the implications of our approach
by applying it to a series of examples.
I. THE FREE SPEECH/CIVIL LIABILITY CONTRADICTION
  There is a significant contradiction at the heart of First Amendment
law.  When private parties restrict speech through a civil lawsuit, two
seemingly opposing rules apply.  On the one hand, when private parties
sue in tort to remedy injuries resulting from speech, the First
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Amendment unquestionably provides robust protection to the speaker.
On the other hand, when private parties use contract or property law to
restrict speech, the First Amendment provides little to no scrutiny.  These
longstanding and widely accepted rules, however, are not always congru-
ent.  In fact, they conflict in a significant number of circumstances.  Cur-
rent First Amendment theory lacks a compelling justification for why we
treat tort rules differently from those sounding in property or contract.15
In this Part, we describe this conflict, explain its origins, and discuss its
contradictory elements.
A. Civil Liability Restricted by the First Amendment
Today, it is nearly unquestioned—both doctrinally and norma-
tively—that certain kinds of tort liability can violate the First Amendment.
Under current law, tort lawsuits by private individuals are subject to First
Amendment limitations, even where no government actor is involved in
the conduct giving rise to tort liability.  For example, the First
Amendment mandates that a public figure cannot maintain a defamation
suit unless she proves that the defendant acted with “actual malice”—
either knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the falsity of the state-
ments.16  The First Amendment also requires public figures to establish
actual malice to prevail under the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.17  In tort actions under the public disclosure of private
facts tort, the First Amendment requires strict scrutiny when information
of public concern is involved.18  These are just a few examples.
But things were not always this way.  For most of American history,
private lawsuits did not implicate the First Amendment, regardless of
whether they sought remedies for tort violations or enforced contracts or
property rules.  These categories of “private law” were not attributable to
the government, and thus did not constitute state action.19  The
landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ushered in a dramatic
15. Commentators note that theories to determine the contexts in which the First
Amendment applies are thin or nonexistent.  See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1249–50 (1995) (“[C]ontemporary First
Amendment doctrine is nevertheless striking chiefly for its superficiality, its internal
incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive judicial engagement with
significant contemporary social issues connected with freedom of speech.”); Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1786 (2004) (“[I]f there exists a single
theory that can explain the First Amendment’s coverage, it has not yet been found.”).
16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334–36 (1974).
17. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
18. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (allowing punishment of
such disclosures “only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order”).
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 36–37, 39
(expanded ed. 1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democracy and Free Speech] (discussing
widely held pre-New Deal understanding that “common law rules simply implement
existing rights, or private desires, and do not amount to ‘intervention’ or ‘action’ at all”).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-OCT-09 12:12
2009] RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1657
change to this settled understanding.20  In Sullivan, an Alabama police
commissioner sued the New York Times and some Alabama clergymen for
libel.  He claimed that an advertisement in the Times by a civil rights
group made false statements about him.  Sullivan’s $500,000 judgment
was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court.  The Times argued that the
lawsuit infringed upon First Amendment rights, but the Alabama
Supreme Court dismissed this argument because private lawsuits did not
involve state action.21
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a defamation law-
suit by a public figure constituted state action.  Writing for the Court,
Justice William Brennan reasoned that where libel actions had the poten-
tial to significantly chill public debate, even “private” actions like defama-
tion could infringe First Amendment rights:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petition-
ers claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press.  It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only,
though supplemented by statute.  The test is not the form in
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.22
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Court held that the
First Amendment limited defamation lawsuits brought by public officials
in order to ensure that debate on matters of public concern be “uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open.”23  The Court concluded that the First
Amendment did not bar defamation tort liability entirely, but required
that public officials prove at least “actual malice” to prevail.24  Actual mal-
ice is difficult to prove, thus serving as a significant limitation to the defa-
mation torts of libel and slander.25  The Court also limited the kinds of
damages that public official plaintiffs could obtain.26
The Sullivan case changed First Amendment law in two major ways.
First, the Court declared what leading First Amendment scholar Harry
Kalven termed “the central meaning of the First Amendment”—that the
First Amendment, at its core, protected criticism of public officials essen-
tial for meaningful democratic self-governance.27  Such linkages between
free speech and democratic theory had been suggested in the past by
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d. 25, 40 (Ala. 1962), rev’d 376 U.S. 254.
22. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 270.
24. Id. at 279–80.
25. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 Neb. L.
Rev. 754, 763–64 (1999) (discussing how courts make determinations of actual malice).
26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283–84.
27. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A Note on “The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment,” 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 208 [hereinafter Kalven, Central Meaning].
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James Madison,28 Alexander Meiklejohn,29 and Louis Brandeis,30 among
others, but Sullivan enshrined this idea as the new lodestone of First
Amendment jurisprudence.  Many First Amendment scholars celebrated
the Sullivan decision, including an elderly Meiklejohn, who quipped that
it was “an occasion for dancing in the streets.”31
Sullivan’s second major change was to apply the First Amendment to
private law.  Previously, hardly any scholars had suggested the idea that
defamation lawsuits should trigger First Amendment scrutiny.32  Perhaps
recognizing its significant departure from the settled understanding that
enforcement of private law rules generally did not implicate the First
Amendment, the Sullivan Court intentionally crafted a narrow rule.  The
Court held only “that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award
damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of
their official conduct,” and that in such cases proof of actual malice by
the public official was constitutionally required.33  Despite the narrow-
ness of this holding, Sullivan had profound implications.  Although
Sullivan was not the first time that the Court held that a private law rule
could violate the First Amendment,34 it served as a critical turning point.
After Sullivan, the Court began to widely apply the First Amendment to
private lawsuits.35
Over the next few years, the Court expanded the Sullivan rule in
defamation law.  In 1967, for example, the Supreme Court decided Curtis
28. See James Madison, The Virginia Report of 1799–1800, Touching the Alien and
Sedition Laws; Together with the Virginia Resolutions 227 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1850)
(arguing right to elect members of government “depends on the knowledge of the
comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust; and on the equal
freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the
candidates respectively”).
29. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 26–27
(1948).
30. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
31. Quoted in Kalven, Central Meaning, supra note 27, at 221 n.125. R
32. See id. at 192 n.4 (“The question of the constitutionality of the law of defamation
has occasioned comparatively little commentary.”).  For the handful of exceptions, see, for
example, Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”:  A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 549, 557–58 (1962) (quoting Justice Black as saying that First
Amendment as ratified intended that “there should be no libel or defamation law in the
United States under the United States Government” and that “the same rule should apply
to the states”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Law of Defamation and the First Amendment, in The
University of Chicago Law School Conference on the Arts, Publishing, and the Law 3, 3
(1952) (“[T]he challenge of the topic [of defamation] for free speech arises because we
are so sure that the core of defamation law is indubitably constitutional.”).
33. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
34. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946) (holding that use of trespass
law violates First Amendment when property owner is running privately owned “company
town”).
35. This invitation to apply the First Amendment more broadly was recognized by
contemporary observers.  See, e.g., Kalven, Central Meaning, supra note 27, at 221 (“[T]he R
invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to
public policy to matters in the public domain, like art, seems . . . to be overwhelming.”).
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Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, broadening the
Sullivan rule beyond public officials to so-called “public figures”—those
persons who are “intimately involved in the resolution of important pub-
lic questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern
to society at large.”36  Subsequent cases extended the rule to “limited-
purpose public figures”—individuals, not of general fame, who have
“thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”37
The Court also applied the First Amendment beyond defamation to
a variety of speech torts.38  The first significant expansion of the Sullivan
rule involved the false light privacy tort.  False light actions remedy the
publication of facts that place the defendant in “a false light” and are
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”39  The tort was popularized by
William Prosser in his review of the common law of privacy,40 and by the
mid-1960s was viewed as a potential rival to defamation.41  In 1967, the
Court held in Time, Inc. v. Hill that false light actions raised many of the
same threats to public discourse as defamation, and therefore the same
First Amendment limitations should apply.42
A number of other cases extended First Amendment protections
(though not always the actual malice requirement) to other privacy ac-
tions.  For example, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court held that
the media could not be held liable under the public disclosure of private
facts tort for revealing a rape victim’s name obtained from a public court
record.43  In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a newspaper printed a rape victim’s
36. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 130, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (consolidating Associated Press v. Walker into same decision).
37. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
38. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 915 (1982)
(holding, relying on Sullivan, state could not impose tort liability for malicious
interference with business where activities giving rise to tort were merely peaceful protests
by civil rights activists calling for boycott).
39. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
40. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 2, at 398–401. R
41. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts,
and Walker, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 271 n.15 (“[O]ne consequence of the Hill case will be
to retard substantially, if not altogether block, the tendencies of false light privacy to take
over the field of defamation.”); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 339–41 (1966) (discussing
“current tendency of privacy actions to move into the traditional field of defamation”);
John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093, 1095–96
(1962) (studying relationship between false light and defamation torts).  While both torts
protect against material false statements, the principal difference between false light and
defamation is the theory of damages.  False light remedies false statements that cause
emotional or psychological injuries, while defamation remedies false statements that cause
damage to a person’s reputation.  Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy
Law 197 (3d ed. 2009).
42. 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967).
43. 420 U.S. 469, 495–96 (1975).  Two subsequent cases extended the Cox rule
beyond the civil liability context.  See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105–06
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name that it copied from a police report.  A lower court had found the
newspaper negligent per se for violating a Florida statute that prohibited
the disclosure of rape victims’ names.44  The Supreme Court concluded
that the First Amendment barred civil liability for disclosing information
of public significance that was lawfully obtained.45  In Bartnicki v. Vopper,
the Court held that the First Amendment required heightened scrutiny
of a provision in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act creating lia-
bility for disclosing information with knowledge that it was obtained by an
illegal wiretap when such information was of “public concern.”46  In
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the Court unanimously applied the Sullivan
actual malice rule to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress47—engaging in “extreme and outrageous conduct” and “intention-
ally or recklessly caus[ing] severe emotional distress to another.”48  These
cases illustrate that it is now widely accepted and rarely questioned that
the First Amendment applies to tort lawsuits when speech is implicated.
B. Civil Liability Not Restricted by the First Amendment
Although tort law implicates the First Amendment under modern
constitutional jurisprudence, the First Amendment provides little to no
restrictions when other private law rules restrict speech.  Such is the case
with contract law and property law.
1. Contracts and Promissory Estoppel. — The litany of cases applying
the First Amendment to torts eventually raised the issue of whether the
First Amendment should apply to contract law and promissory estoppel
lawsuits that implicated speech.  The Supreme Court addressed this issue
in the 1991 case of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.49  In Cohen, a group of sup-
porters for Wheelock Whitney, a candidate for the governorship of
Minnesota, met to discuss how to release their discovery that a rival candi-
date had been arrested for unlawful assembly and petty theft more than a
decade earlier.  They agreed that Dan Cohen, who worked for an adver-
tising agency on the Whitney campaign, would disclose the information
anonymously to the media.  Cohen contacted several journalists, secured
promises of confidentiality, and then revealed the information, which
consisted of two public court documents showing that the rival candidate
had been convicted of numerous minor crimes including theft.50  The
Minneapolis Star Tribune decided to report Cohen’s identity in order to
(1979) (striking down misdemeanor indictment for publishing information about juvenile
involved in criminal proceeding); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311–12
(1977) (holding state court cannot prohibit media from publishing information gleaned
by attending proceeding involving juvenile).
44. 491 U.S. 524, 528–29 (1989).
45. Id. at 541.
46. 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
47. 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
48. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
49. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
50. Id.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 12 26-OCT-09 12:12
2009] RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1661
reveal that the source was connected to the Whitney campaign.  Cohen
was fired immediately after his name was published.  He sued the Star
Tribune and other newspapers for breach of contract and fraudulent mis-
representation.51  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Cohen’s
claims on nonconstitutional grounds, but added that promissory estoppel
would be a viable cause of action if it were not barred by the First
Amendment.52
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  It held that liability for promis-
sory estoppel would not trigger First Amendment restrictions.53  The
Court first noted that under the theory of state action laid out in Sullivan,
the enforcement of a promissory estoppel claim by the Minnesota courts
was sufficient state action to implicate the First Amendment.54  However,
the Court concluded that unlike torts, promissory estoppel actions did
not warrant any kind of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.55
In a short opinion, the Court offered a number of rationales.  First, it
reasoned that a newspaper is bound by a variety of generally applicable
laws that can restrict its speech, and that it is irrelevant in such cases that
speech is restricted or that the defendant is a newspaper:
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of
promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability.  It does not
target or single out the press.  Rather, insofar as we are advised,
the doctrine is generally applicable to the daily transactions of
all the citizens of Minnesota.  The First Amendment does not
forbid its application to the press.56
Second, the Court stated that the “self-imposed” nature of the duty
of confidentiality involved in the case was different from tort liability,
where duties were imposed by the government.  The Court distinguished
Florida Star and related cases:
In those cases, the State itself defined the content of publica-
tions that would trigger liability.  Here, by contrast, Minnesota
law simply required those making promises to keep them.  The
parties themselves, as in this case, determined the scope of their
legal obligations, and any restrictions that were placed on the
publication of truthful information are self-imposed.57
Thus, it was significant that the duty not to speak had been defined
(and agreed to) by private parties, rather than by the state itself, and the
state role was merely to enforce the private agreements rather than dictat-
ing their terms as well.
51. Id. at 666.
52. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S.
663.
53. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
54. Id. at 668.
55. Id. at 671–72.
56. Id. at 670.
57. Id. at 670–71.
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Third, the Court noted that Cohen was not “attempting to use a
promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for
establishing a libel or defamation claim.”58  In other words, Cohen’s use
of promissory estoppel was not a mere end run around the First
Amendment limitations to torts such as defamation or intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
Perhaps because it was not clear which (if any) of these three theo-
ries drove the outcome in Cohen, Justice White’s majority opinion pro-
voked significant commentary.  Some viewed Cohen as a threat to freedom
of speech and press.59  Others saw the case as enhancing press freedom.
For example, Jerome Barron argued that “First Amendment values were
served, rather than denied, by enforcing the reporters’ promises to
Cohen for two reasons—protection of the flow of information and pro-
tection of the integrity of journalism.”60  Regardless of the merits of its
holding, Cohen created a morass of doctrinal confusion.  Lower courts
applying Cohen have struggled to distinguish promissory estoppel and
contract from other instances of civil liability, seizing upon one or more
of the various rationales offered by the Court to determine when the
Cohen rule should apply.61  Noting these developments, Alan Garfield ar-
gues that Cohen is incoherent and that the First Amendment should apply
to both tort and contract actions that restrict speech:  “[I]t is not suffi-
cient for courts to blithely enforce contracts of silence based on a notion
of freedom of contract while ignoring the consequences of such action
58. Id. at 671.
59. See, e.g., David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26
Sw. U. L. Rev. 201, 229–30 (1997) (arguing Cohen went beyond precedent “to validate,
without further analysis, a generally applicable law that resulted in a direct impact on
speech”); Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1087,
1087 (2001) [hereinafter Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen] (“Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. has
had a remarkably insidious influence on First Amendment law.”).
60. Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and Its Significance for First Amendment
Law and Journalism, 3 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 419, 462 (1994); see also Joseph H.
Kaufman, Beyond Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.:  Confidentiality Agreements and Efficiency
Within the Marketplace of Ideas, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F. 255, 268–69 (making similar
argument from economic perspective); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Leading Cases:
Damages for a Reporter’s Breach of Confidence: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 277, 280 (1991) (same).  A survey of newspaper editors undertaken shortly after Cohen
suggests that editors also did not see the decision as a major intrusion upon press freedom.
See Daniel A. Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rupert, Promises of Confidentiality to News Sources
After Cohen v. Cowles Media Company:  A Survey of Newspaper Editors, 24 Golden Gate U. L.
Rev. 423, 461 (1994).  Levin and Rupert noted that just over one-third of interviewees
thought that the Cohen case was “not a serious infringement on editors’ First Amendment
freedom,” and a similar percentage acknowledged that it was a “somewhat serious
infringement.”  Id.  Fewer than one in four interviewees “thought it was a serious
infringement,” and “about eight percent thought it was a very serious infringement.”  Id.
Therefore, “despite the potential for a new source of liability, about seventy percent of
interviewees accepted the Cohen result as fair and not a particularly serious infringement
on editors’ rights.”  Id.
61. See infra Part II.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 14 26-OCT-09 12:12
2009] RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1663
on freedom of speech . . . . Courts must address this conflict directly by
weighing the competing interests and determining which one should pre-
vail.”62  Numerous questions about when the Cohen rule applies remain:
Does it apply to all contracts, express or implied?  Can it apply to certain
kinds of tort actions?  To statutory protections of confidentiality?  Rather
than clearing up when the First Amendment applies to civil liability,
Cohen instead left behind more questions than answers.
2. Property. — Like contract law, the Supreme Court has rarely sub-
jected property law to First Amendment scrutiny.  Despite the Supreme
Court’s realist admonition in Sullivan that common law rules of all sorts
are highly regulatory, current law continues to reflect the belief that
property, like contract, is in some sense separate from the state and does
not implicate constitutional guarantees.63  Unlike in the Cohen contexts
of contract and promissory estoppel, where the courts will find state ac-
tion but then refuse to invoke First Amendment scrutiny, when a private
party seeks to enforce property rights, courts often will not even find state
action.  Private property owners can thus use the enforcement power of
the government to exclude speakers from their property merely because
they dislike the message being conveyed.64  By contrast, such a power has
long been unthinkable for the government to exercise on its own
behalf.65
In a few limited contexts, the Supreme Court has departed from the
general rule that enforcing property rights against private parties does
not implicate the Constitution.  For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, the
Court held that the First Amendment applied to the agents of a company
town seeking to exclude religious canvassers from public areas because
the owner of the company town had assumed a “public function.”66  And
in Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court determined that racially restrictive cove-
nants in a private deed violated the Fourteenth Amendment.67
62. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence:  Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
Cornell L. Rev. 261, 363–64 (1998).
63. Sunstein, Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 19, at 39. R
64. This is the rule under the federal constitution, although state constitutions may
grant licensees of certain kinds of real property rights to speak freely even where the
property owners object.  Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976)
(upholding shopping mall’s exclusion of labor picketers from public areas of mall over
picketers’ First Amendment challenge), with PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 88 (1980) (holding state constitutional right to free speech may extend to protect
speech in privately owned shopping center).
65. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943) (holding
unconstitutional city ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation used to convict
proselytizing Jehovah’s Witness); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939)
(voiding city ordinance used to prosecute Jehovah’s Witnesses for door-to-door
proselytizing); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (voiding city ordinance used to
prevent labor organization and pamphleteering).
66. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
67. 334 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1948).
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Ultimately, however, the Court narrowed and constrained Marsh and
Shelley.  Subsequent cases essentially limited Shelley to its facts, perhaps to
prevent state action from being implicated whenever a court enforced a
private law rule.68  Likewise, although the Court flirted with expanding
Marsh,69 it ultimately limited that case to its facts as well.70  In Hudgens v.
NLRB, the Court held that a shopping center could exclude protestors
without implicating the First Amendment because “the First and
Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assem-
bly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private
property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”71
Under current doctrine, when private parties seek to use the courts
to exclude speakers from their property under a trespass theory, the First
Amendment is generally inapplicable for want of state action.72  The First
Amendment applies to trespass law only where a property owner is found
to be “performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and [stands] in
the shoes of the State.”73  Homeowners can use trespass law to exclude
unwanted speakers from their residences without implicating the First
Amendment.74  Similarly, a company can enforce property laws against
protestors trespassing in its lobby without triggering First Amendment
scrutiny.75
The Court’s First Amendment treatment of property rules restricting
speech has not escaped criticism.  For example, Cass Sunstein has argued
that although we tend to think of property rules as somehow separate
from the state, in reality property law itself is a form of government regu-
lation which is deeply entangled with state action and state power.76  Tak-
68. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 Emory L.J. 171, 193 (2004)
(collecting cases and noting, “with virtually no exceptions, courts have concluded that the
judicial enforcement of private agreements inhibiting speech does not trigger
constitutional review”).
69. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 309 (1968), overruled by Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507 (holding owner of shopping
center cannot prohibit “peaceful picketing of a business enterprise located within [the]
shopping center”).
70. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518 (overruling Logan Valley Plaza); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556–63, 570 (1972) (“Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind
of situation. Marsh dealt with the very special situation of a company-owned town . . . .”
(quoting Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. at 330–31 (Black, J., dissenting))).
71. 424 U.S. at 519 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 567).
72. See id.
73. Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 568–69 (footnote omitted)).
74. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (“[T]raditional legal
methods [leave] to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive
strangers as visitors . . . .”).
75. See, e.g., Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519 (holding picketers had no First Amendment
right to enter shopping center to advertise strike); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 519 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding employees trespassed by intruding into
and secretly videotaping area of store not open to public).
76. Sunstein, Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 19, at 39. R
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ing a cue from the implications of Shelley v. Kraemer,77 Sunstein also ar-
gues that in the case of shopping centers, the “owners of the shopping
center are able to exclude the protesters only because the government
has conferred upon them a legal right to do so.  The conferral of that
right is an exercise of state power.”78
Therefore, despite a few very narrow exceptions, the general rule
remains clear that the First Amendment is inapplicable to civil actions to
enforce property rules in ways that restrict speech.
C. Free Speech and Civil Liability:  A Collision Course
As the preceding discussion makes clear, two diametrically opposing
rules govern the intersection of civil liability and free speech.  Certain
forms of civil liability are subject to full First Amendment scrutiny while
other forms are not.  These two rules—the rule in Sullivan, which often
applies in tort cases, and the rule in Cohen, which often applies in con-
tract and property cases—are both widely accepted today.  These conflict-
ing rules would not present a problem if there were a clear and coherent
way to determine which rule should apply to any given situation.  Unfor-
tunately, the boundaries between tort, contract, and property law are
quite fuzzy, and these areas of law overlap in significant ways.  Thus, there
is a wide range of circumstances where both rules would seemingly apply.
1. The Fuzzy Lines Between Forms of Civil Liability. — At a very general
level, it appears that the First Amendment applies to civil liability under
tort but not under contract or property.  Making the distinction of First
Amendment applicability on the basis of these categories of law would
seem to be the most simple and direct approach.  However, in both doc-
trine and theory, the lines between tort, contract, and property are indis-
tinct, and these categories often overlap.
Consider first the line between tort and property.  Torts like trespass
and conversion are often used to enforce property rights.79  Other torts
exist in the fuzzy area between tort and property as well.  For example,
the right to publicity tort protects against appropriating “the commercial
value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade.”80  Should this
tort be classified as a tort or a property right?  In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
77. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
78. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 208 (1993).
79. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass); § 222A
(1964) (defining conversion).
80. The Restatement of Unfair Competition defines the right of publicity as follows:
“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is
subject to liability . . . .”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995).  The
“right of publicity” was first explicitly recognized by Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 17 26-OCT-09 12:12
1666 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 109:1650
Broadcasting Co.,81 the Court refused to apply the Sullivan rule to the tort,
noting that while torts such as defamation and false light involve protec-
tion against reputational harm and mental distress, the right of publicity
protects “the proprietary interest of the individual” and “is closely analo-
gous to the goals of patent and copyright law.”82
Zacchini, however, involved a unique factual situation where a per-
former’s entire act was filmed and rebroadcast on a television news pro-
gram.  The Court focused heavily on the fact that his “entire act” was
involved and that the broadcast of it “poses a substantial threat to the
economic value of that performance.”83  Several federal courts have dis-
tinguished Zacchini, concluding that the First Amendment can be vio-
lated when the right of publicity restricts speech of public concern.84  In
such cases, courts seem to treat the right of publicity as a privacy tort
rather than as a species of property.85  The fact that the right of publicity
is a tort is of little help in determining how the First Amendment should
apply.  Currently, where this tort fits between tort and property remains
unclear, as does whether the Sullivan or Cohen rule should apply.
The line between tort and contract is also quite nebulous.  The clas-
sic hornbook definitions of the two cast torts as civil wrongs or breaches
of legally imposed duties,86 and contracts as agreements between two or
more parties that lead to legally enforceable duties.87  Unlike tort duties,
which apply against the whole world,88 contractual obligations extend
only to the parties to a transaction.89  The Restatement defines a contract
as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty.”90  From this perspective, then, tort and contract are two distinct
and theoretically separate sources of liability.  Under the traditional view,
81. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 575.
84. See, e.g., CBC Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball, 505 F.3d 818,
823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding names, statistics, and biographical information of
professional baseball players are matters of public interest protected by First Amendment);
CBS Interactive Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 08-5097, 2009 WL 1151982,
at *21 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2009) (holding same with respect to NFL football players).  In
the interest of full disclosure, we should note that one of the authors represented the First
Amendment claimants in both of these cases.
85. See Richards & Solove, supra note 9, at 153 (identifying right of publicity as R
offshoot of privacy torts).
86. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Prosser, Wade and Schwartz’s Torts:  Cases and Materials
1 (11th ed. 2005).
87. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981).
88. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 1 cmt. d (1965).
89. William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter Prosser, Handbook].
90. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts
§ 1.1, at 4 (4th ed. 2004) (“[A] limitation suggested by this definition is that the law of
contracts is confined to promises.  It is therefore concerned with exchanges that relate to
the future because a ‘promise’ is a commitment as to future behavior.”).
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breach of contract remedies the breaking of a promise undertaken volun-
tarily by the parties, and is a species of strict liability.  Tort law, by con-
trast, involves duties mandated by law, and rests primarily on fault rather
than strict liability.91
Yet both in practice and theory, the distinction between tort and
contract is not as neat as it may at first appear.  In his classic work The
Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore argued that tort and contract bleed into
each other.92  Gilmore contended that contract law was an intellectual
construct of the nineteenth century that came to be absorbed by tort law
over the course of the next hundred years.93  Despite the efforts of con-
tract theorists like Holmes and Williston to cast contract as a form of
absolute rather than fault-based liability, the death of contract occurred
with the rise of the twentieth century welfare state and the introduction
of fault-based doctrines such as excuse and mistake, as well as mandatory
duties such as promissory estoppel, into contract law.  As Jody Kraus puts
it, “Gilmore’s assault on contracts was double-edged:  Contracts as a dis-
tinctive and unified body of law did not exist prior to the successful ef-
forts of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston to manufacture it out of whole
cloth, and it was eroded by tort law after its creation.”94
Gilmore’s arguments have been influential among judges and legal
scholars.95  Although the law continues to retain a formal distinction be-
tween tort and contract, a number of important legal doctrines fall in the
gray area between the two.  For example, consider torts that arise in the
context of relationships, such as the duties of care, loyalty, and confiden-
tiality imposed on lawyers and clients, agents and principals, or buyers
and sellers.96  Such torts seemingly fit both under contract law and tort
law.  They could be viewed as torts because they remedy a civil wrong, but
they could also be viewed as contracts because they arise from express or
implied duties agreed to by parties to a private transaction.
The indistinct boundaries between tort on the one hand, and con-
tracts and property on the other, means that even if one were inclined to
use the formal categories of private law to separate the Sullivan rule from
the Cohen rule, such an approach would be indeterminate and ultimately
fruitless.  Indeed, lower courts have avoided a formalistic approach in ap-
plying Cohen to tort, contract, and property.  For example, in Food Lion,
Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the Fourth Circuit concluded that Cohen
applied to breach of duty of loyalty and trespass, despite the fact that both
91. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 3, at 5 (2001).
92. Gilmore, supra note 8, at 87. R
93. Id. at 6–9.
94. Jody S. Kraus, From Langdell to Law and Economics:  Two Conceptions of Stare
Decisis in Contract Law and Theory, 94 Va. L. Rev. 157, 179–80 (2008).
95. See Robert Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore’s The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 32, 32 (1995).
96. Dobbs, supra note 91, at 6. R
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are torts.97  Conversely, some courts have applied the Sullivan rule to con-
tract cases.  In Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Services, Inc., for exam-
ple, Compuware contended that Moody’s violated an implied contractual
term to perform a credit rating assessment diligently.98  The court con-
cluded:  “While ostensibly presenting a breach of contract claim, this ar-
gument is grounded in negligence, and amounts to nothing more than a
backdoor attempt to recover damages for the harm allegedly caused by
Moody’s protected expression of its opinion of Compuware’s financial
condition.”99  The court therefore imposed the First Amendment re-
quirements for defamation, which mandated that Compuware prove ac-
tual malice.100
Moreover, making rigid distinctions between tort, contract, and
property is contrary to the basic philosophical insight about the nature of
state power articulated in Sullivan. If First Amendment law is centrally
concerned with state censorship, it is important to note that sometimes
the state can censor just as effectively through legal forms that are private
as it can through ones that are public.101  In Sullivan, the state used a
private tort action to impose liability, but in other cases it could use prop-
erty law:  for example, by marking out “free speech zones”102 or by creat-
ing intellectual property rights in certain kinds of information (like presi-
dential speeches).103  As Eugene Volokh notes, “[c]alling a speech
restriction a ‘property right’ . . . doesn’t make it any less a speech restric-
tion, and it doesn’t make it constitutionally permissible.  Broad, pre-New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan libel laws can be characterized as protecting a
property right in reputation; in fact, some states consider reputation a
property interest.”104  A state could also use contract law to achieve simi-
lar goals.
There is nothing magical about the invocation of tort that somehow
differentiates it from property and contract when it comes to threatening
First Amendment values.  Justice Brennan made this point in Sullivan by
noting that the First Amendment was threatened not by “the form in
97. 194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999).  We should note by way of full disclosure that
one of the authors worked on this case while clerking for the Fourth Circuit.
98. 499 F.3d 520, 531 (6th Cir. 2007).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Sunstein, Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 19, at 42–43. R
102. See Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors:  Preserving First Amendment Liberties
in Public Places 61–62 (2009) (discussing recent phenomenon of expressive zoning).
103. See Comment, What Is a “Publication of the United States of Government”?  A
Search for a Meaningful Solution, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 579, 579–80 (1963) (suggesting
government employees have personal copyrights on works not created explicitly in exercise
of official duties but which nonetheless exist as result of their employment).
104. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049,
1063 (2000) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech].
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 20 26-OCT-09 12:12
2009] RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1669
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
power has in fact been exercised.”105
Therefore, the realist critique of the distinctions between tort, con-
tract, and property suggests that the formalist approach is not as clear-cut
as it might at first seem.  Legal categories have a way of bleeding into
each other.  A clear formalist distinction between forms of civil liability is
elusive, if not impossible.
2. The Problem of Confidentiality. — Within the rather large area where
tort and contract overlap sits the law of confidentiality.  The problem of
how to treat confidentiality rules under the First Amendment illustrates
not only the blurriness of the tort/contract distinction, but also the prac-
tical consequences at stake.  Confidentiality rules involve instances where
one party has a legal duty not to disclose certain information it has ac-
quired from another party.  These rules include:  (1) the breach of confi-
dentiality tort, which imposes liability for disclosing another person’s con-
fidential information if in breach of a duty of confidentiality; (2) the
breach of an express or implied contract of confidentiality; (3) statutory
provisions restricting the disclosure of confidential information; (4) pro-
tective orders preventing the disclosure of confidential information ob-
tained during discovery; and (5) trade secret law restricting the disclosure
of confidential information maintained by businesses.  There are also
other confidentiality rules not involving civil liability, such as criminal
prohibitions on divulging certain kinds of confidential information, evi-
dentiary privileges restricting testimony about confidential data, and stat-
utory protections that limit the release of confidential information by cer-
tain companies or government agencies.106
How should the First Amendment deal with such rules?  Suppose the
personal physician to the CEO of a major corporation discloses to the
public that the CEO has dementia and that it will compromise the CEO’s
ability to perform his duties.  The company plays a major role in the U.S.
economy, and thus the information is highly newsworthy.  Hundreds of
thousands of jobs are at stake, as are the fortunes of millions of investors.
The doctor is about to retire, so she is not concerned with any profes-
sional consequences for breaching physician ethics.  After the doctor dis-
closes the information, the CEO sues for breach of an implied contract of
confidentiality and for violating the breach of confidentiality tort.  The
doctor claims that the First Amendment bars liability.  Should a court
restrict liability for the implied contract action?  The breach of confiden-
tiality tort action?  This hypothetical demonstrates the similarity between
105. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1963).
106. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1996) (discussing evidentiary
privileges recognized by common law); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 517 n.3
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing examples of statutory protections of
confidential government information); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers),
403 U.S. 713, 735–39 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (same); see also Daniel J. Solove,
Understanding Privacy 136–40 (2008) (discussing confidentiality rules).
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certain contract and tort actions.  The breach of confidentiality tort is a
private cause of action that has both tort-like and contract-like elements.
Duties of confidentiality can be created by express contracts or implied as
a matter of law from the circumstances of a relationship.107  In many in-
stances, the breach of confidentiality tort remedies a harm akin to those
protected by contract law or promissory estoppel.  One party voluntarily
assumes a duty, either through an express or implied contract or prom-
ise.  Breach of confidentiality differs from other torts such as defamation
and public disclosure of private facts because the duty of confidentiality is
understood as arising from a consensual relationship.  Beyond a formalis-
tic distinction between tort and contract, why should such different First
Amendment consequences follow from the CEO’s breach of confidential-
ity tort and implied contract actions?  For the purposes of the First
Amendment, the nature of the information involved is the same regard-
less of whether contract or tort liability is involved.  Moreover, the basic
theory upon which liability is premised is also largely the same—an ex-
press or implied assumption of a duty of confidentiality.
Although breach of confidence has long been neglected in
American law, it is increasing in importance.  The breach of confidential-
ity tort has been the primary tort protecting privacy in England, and it
has its foundations in the same cases as the American version of the
tort.108  The English tort is quite robust in its application—friends,
spouses, lovers, and nearly anybody else can be liable for breaching a duty
of confidentiality.109  In the United States, the breach of confidentiality
tort has developed more slowly and narrowly than the English version,
and it applies primarily to certain professionals such as attorneys and doc-
tors, and to institutions like banks and hospitals.110  During the past few
decades, however, the breach of confidentiality tort has undergone a tre-
mendous expansion in America, and it continues to grow.111  If the
American tort develops to resemble its English cousin, then it could play
a potent role in the protection of information privacy.
At the doctrinal level, the breach of confidentiality tort lacks many of
the limitations of the public disclosure of private facts tort.  The public
disclosure tort creates liability when a person widely discloses “a matter
concerning the private life of another” that is “highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person” and “not of legitimate concern to the public.”112  In con-
107. Richards & Solove, supra note 9, at 157; see also Susan M. Gilles, Promises R
Betrayed:  Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 1,
20–25 (1995) (discussing “efforts to use contract to remedy . . . breaches of confidence”);
Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence:  An Emerging Tort, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1426,
1426 (1982) (discussing development of breach of confidence tort).
108. See Richards & Solove, supra note 9, at 124–33 (discussing development of R
American and English privacy law).
109. Id. at 124–27, 158–73.
110. Id. at 157–58.
111. Id.
112. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
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trast, the breach of confidentiality tort contains no requirement that the
information disclosed be “highly offensive” or not of legitimate public
concern.113  Under the breach of confidence tort, a “defendant is not
released from an obligation of confidentiality merely because the infor-
mation learned constitutes a matter of legitimate public interest.”114  Al-
though much information gleaned in connection with a person’s rela-
tionships with lawyers, doctors, bankers, or others might be of legitimate
public concern, the breach of confidentiality tort lacks a newsworthiness
requirement because the law recognizes the importance of ensuring trust
and candor in these relationships.
Current legal theory provides no coherent way to determine whether
rules of this sort implicate or violate the First Amendment.  Despite the
fact that the breach of confidentiality tort is now recognized in a majority
of jurisdictions,115 hardly any courts have looked at the First Amendment
issues.  Our research produced only one case, a 1991 trial court decision
from New York.  In Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hospital, a patient sued a
hospital and doctor for breach of confidentiality.116  The defendants
raised a First Amendment defense, but the court concluded that Cohen
governed and thus that the First Amendment did not bar liability.117
The handful of commentators who have examined the issue have
come to differing conclusions.  Susan Gilles contends that the breach of
confidentiality tort, because it “targets only speech,” is not sufficiently
neutral to fall under Cohen.118  She argues that the breach of confidenti-
ality tort can create a chilling effect on speech because it is too unclear
about when a speaker is under a duty of confidentiality, and thus it
“greatly increases the speaker’s fear of speaking.”119  Therefore, she con-
cludes, “the tortious action for breach of confidence faces either auto-
matic unconstitutionality or a scrutiny so strict that no plaintiff can re-
cover.”120  Andrew McClurg agrees with Gilles, contending that “a breach
of confidence tort directly targets speech,”121 and that implied contract
should be the appropriate remedy for victims of confidentiality
113. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 A.2d
580, 591 (D.C. 1985) (“The tort of breach of confidential relationship is generally
described as consisting of the ‘unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of
nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship.’”
(quoting Vickery, supra note 107, at 1455)). R
114. Id.
115. David A. Elder, Privacy Torts § 5:2, at 5-6 to -8 (2006) (stating that “clear modern
consensus of the case law” is to recognize breach of confidentiality tort in context of
physician-patient confidentiality).
116. 573 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829–30 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
117. Id. at 830.
118. Gilles, supra note 107, at 72–73. R
119. Id. at 82.
120. Id. at 75.
121. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy
Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 887, 906 n.126 (2006)
(citing Gilles, supra note 107, at 72–73). R
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breaches.122  Alan Vickery, whose Note on the breach of confidentiality
tort has become one of the most influential pieces written on the topic,
contends that the First Amendment applies to the tort and would man-
date a newsworthiness test—that the information not be of legitimate
public concern.123  In contrast to Gilles, McClurg, and Vickery, Peter
Winn notes that the First Amendment does not appear to prohibit liabil-
ity based on a “contractual or professional duty” and that the “Supreme
Court has shown itself to be extremely deferential in the constitutional
review of legal enforcement of nondisclosure agreements when such
agreements are in the context of an independent and legitimately estab-
lished relationship of confidentiality.”124
The scholars contending that First Amendment scrutiny applies to
the breach of confidentiality tort do not analyze why the free speech in-
terests involved in contract and promissory estoppel are different from
those involved with the tort.  McClurg, for example, advocates the im-
plied contract action as a near functional equivalent to the breach of con-
fidentiality tort, yet he does not address why the First Amendment should
apply differently to each beyond the formalistic difference that one is an
action in tort and the other is an action in contract.125  Gilles’s critique
that a lack of clarity exists in identifying duties of confidentiality could
just as readily be applied when such duties are found via implied contract
or promissory estoppel.126  In their defense, however, these scholars are
not focusing primarily on this issue in their works and thus do not devote
extensive analysis to it.
Therefore, although the law of confidentiality is quite large and
growing, it currently remains in First Amendment limbo.  And confidenti-
ality is just one example of the areas of civil liability that inhabit the vor-
tex in which the conflicting Sullivan and Cohen rules could both purport-
edly apply.  A coherent theory is sorely needed to define the respective
domains of the Sullivan and Cohen rules and determine when civil liability
should trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
II. THEORIES OF FIRST AMENDMENT APPLICABILITY
Given the profound overlap among tort, contract, and property, the
two opposing rules for determining when the First Amendment applies to
civil liability are on a collision course.  As we have illustrated above, the
law of confidentiality brings the issue to the fore.
122. Id. at 908–17.
123. See Vickery, supra note 107, at 1466–68 (discussing “situations in which first R
amendment considerations prohibit imposition of civil liability for breaches of
confidence”).
124. Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace:  The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 Rutgers L.J. 617, 679 (2002).
125. McClurg, supra note 121, at 916–17. R
126. Gilles, supra note 107, at 23–24. R
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Is there a theory that can coherently determine when civil liability
implicates the First Amendment?  Although the free speech and civil lia-
bility conundrum has received less attention than many other problems
of constitutional theory, a number of possible approaches have been
proffered or hinted at by courts and commentators.  We contend that
such a theory should produce relatively determinate outcomes, as this
issue implicates countless tort, contract, and property rules.
In this Part, we assess the descriptive and normative appeal of these
theories.  Although many of these theoretical approaches have their vir-
tues, we conclude that none represents a compelling or a complete solu-
tion to the problem of civil liability for speech.  Our analysis sets the stage
for a new solution to the problem that we will articulate in Part III.
A. The Generally Applicable Law Approach
A leading method used by courts to resolve when civil liability impli-
cates the First Amendment is what we will call the “generally applicable
law approach.”  This theory holds that the First Amendment is only
threatened by legal rules that single out speech for unfavorable treat-
ment.  Laws affecting speech and non-speech activity in a neutral way do
not require First Amendment protection.
The leading example of the generally applicable law approach is
Cohen.127  As Justice White reasoned in his majority opinion, “generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to
gather and report the news.”128  The opinion in Cohen was unclear about
much of its holding,129 including precisely what it meant by a law being
“generally applicable.”  For example, it is unclear whether “a generally
applicable law” is one that applies to both speakers and non-speakers
equally, or merely to all media and non-media defendants equally.130
Since our purpose here is to consider whether the general applicabil-
ity approach can serve as a guide to the problem of free speech and civil
liability, we are examining whether this approach can work without limit-
ing our analysis to what the Supreme Court has specifically articulated.
127. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
128. Id. at 669.
129. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. R
130. Eugene Volokh contends that Cohen is best understood more narrowly as a
freedom of press case.  Under his interpretation, Cohen concluded that the First
Amendment does not require heightened scrutiny for generally applicable laws that do not
single out the press.  See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:  Generally Applicable Laws,
Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90
Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1294–97 (2005).  According to Volokh, the Supreme Court’s general
applicability rationale was focused only on freedom of the press, and its holding that
promissory estoppel does not violate free speech was based on consensual waiver:  “[T]he
Court rejected the free speech argument based on the principle that free speech rights,
like most other rights, are waivable, rather than on an assertion that speech-neutral laws
are per se constitutional.”  Id. at 1297.
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Thus, under the general applicability approach as we will use it, if a law
treats speech and non-speech equally, then it is generally applicable and
does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
Several lower courts following Cohen have used the generally applica-
ble law approach to assess whether civil liability rules were invalid under
the First Amendment.  For example, in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc., the Fourth Circuit concluded that Cohen applied to the torts of
breach of duty of loyalty and trespass committed by two ABC employees
who fraudulently procured employment at a supermarket in order to
conduct an investigative report.131  The court reasoned that “the tort laws
(breach of duty of loyalty and trespass) do not single out the press or
have more than an incidental effect upon its work.”132  The First Circuit,
in Veilleux v. NBC, grappled extensively with how to resolve “the relevant
constitutional implications of a common law misrepresentation action
against a media defendant.”133  One factor the court focused on was that
“misrepresentation under Maine common law is a cause of general appli-
cability.  Applying it to journalists subjects them to the same conse-
quences as all others.”134
Under the generally applicable law approach, then, liability for pub-
lication in violation of express contract, implied contract, and promissory
estoppel would presumably create no First Amendment problem, and
such liability would be permitted.  On the other hand, the First
Amendment would apply (and frequently bar) liability under the public
disclosure of private facts tort because it expressly targets only the act of
speaking.
Although it purports to provide clear boundaries for the applicability
of the First Amendment, the generally applicable law approach suffers
from a fatal analytical problem:  The level of generality with which one
defines a particular area of law will control whether it is generally applica-
ble.  For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court examined a
provision of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) that cre-
ated a private right of action to remedy the collection, use, or disclosure
of information obtained via an illegal wiretap.135  In concluding that the
provision violated the First Amendment, the Court appeared to have as-
sumed the law was not one of general applicability, for the Court never
discussed Cohen.136  The Court, however, focused only on this one provi-
131. 194 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 522.
133. 206 F.3d 92, 126–29 (1st Cir. 2000).
134. Id. at 128.
135. 532 U.S. 514, 520–21 (2001).
136. Id. at 534–35.  The Third Circuit had discussed Cohen extensively in its opinion
below, coming to a rather tenuous distinction by reasoning that the “Cohen opinion thus
instructs that a law of general applicability, which neither targets nor imposes
disproportionate burdens upon the press, is enforceable against the press to the same
extent that it is enforceable against individuals or organizations.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200
F.3d 109, 119 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d 532 U.S. 514 (2001).  The court concluded that “a
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sion of ECPA rather than on the statute as a whole.  Examined as a whole,
ECPA may be viewed as generally applicable:  It prohibits not only speech
involving the disclosure of wiretapped communications, but also the ac-
tivity of engaging in wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveil-
lance.137  Neither the Court’s opinion in Bartnicki nor the generally appli-
cable law approach provides any principle for determining the proper
level of generality with which laws should be assessed.
The generality problem extends beyond Bartnicki to virtually every
area of law where the generally applicable inquiry can be made.  For in-
stance, courts applying the generally applicable law approach to contracts
consider contract law very broadly, as including all types of contracts, and
therefore hold that contract laws are generally applicable.  In contrast,
courts frame tort law more narrowly by focusing on specific torts, and
thus conclude that tort laws are not generally applicable.138  Thus, defa-
mation law is not generally applicable because it involves torts that apply
only to speech, whereas contracts apply to a wide array of situations, only
some of which involve speech.  But why view contract law so broadly?
Specific kinds of contracts—such as confidentiality agreements—apply
only to speech.  Tort law encompasses many kinds of torts, only some of
which primarily implicate speech.  Negligence, for example, can involve
speech or actions.  The same is true for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.  In short, the generally applicable law approach does not
explain the difference in treatment between tort and contract, because
the approach provides no explanation why some bodies of law are de-
fined at a greater level of generality than others.  Since the level of gener-
ality drives the outcomes under the generally applicable law approach,
and there is no coherent explanation for how to define the level of gener-
ality, the generally applicable law approach ultimately tells us nothing.
B. The Consensual Waiver Approach
One of the most widely accepted approaches for determining when
civil liability triggers the First Amendment is to look to whether a person
has consented to the waiver of her First Amendment rights.  Under this
approach, civil liability for speech implicates the First Amendment unless
prohibition on disclosure falls more heavily on the press.”  Id. at 118.  But nearly all
prohibitions on disclosure impact the press in the same way if the information is
newsworthy, as it was in Cohen.
137. ECPA regulates both speech and non-speech activities.  Consider, for example,
the provision at issue in Bartnicki, which punishes as a felony and a civil tort any person
who “(a) intentionally intercepts . . . (b) intentionally uses . . . or (c) intentionally discloses
. . . the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”  18 USC § 2511(1)
(2006).
138. Compare Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515–19 (4th
Cir. 1999) (employing separate First Amendment analyses for the individual torts of
breach of loyalty and trespass), with Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)
(discussing applicability of First Amendment to all contract and promissory estoppel
remedies generally).
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it originated in consensual agreement, such as a contract.  Like the gener-
ally applicable law approach, this theory seems to have done some of the
theoretical work in Cohen.  In that case, the Supreme Court noted that in
the contractual context, the “parties themselves . . . determine the scope
of their legal obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on the
publication of truthful information are self-imposed.”139  According to
this view, because self-imposed restrictions on free speech are consensual
waivers of the right to free speech, they do not implicate the First
Amendment.
Some lower courts have seized on the above language in Cohen, con-
cluding that First Amendment rights are alienable.  On this view, civil
liability does not trigger the First Amendment if a person has consented
to relinquishing their free speech rights.  As one circuit court has noted,
generally, “constitutional rights, like rights and privileges of lesser impor-
tance, may be contractually waived where the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the waiver make it clear that the party forgoing its rights has
done so of its own volition, with full understanding of the consequences
of its waiver.”140
Leading scholars have also embraced the consensual waiver ap-
proach to the problem of speech liability.  For example, Eugene Volokh
argues that the “free speech right must turn on the rights of the speakers,
and . . . it’s proper to let speakers contract away their rights.”141  Volokh
concludes that implied contracts of confidentiality escape the restrictions
of the First Amendment because customs of confidentiality within certain
relationships are well established.142  He notes that laws implying “con-
tracts from transactions in which there’s no social convention of confi-
dentiality are somewhat more troublesome.”143  However, since it is “hard
to determine exactly what most people expect,” statutory default rules of
implied contract “clarify people’s obligations instead of leaving courts to
guess what people likely assumed.”144  Accordingly, Volokh concludes
that legislatures have the power to enact laws requiring implied promises
of confidentiality, at least as long as the parties have the ability to explic-
itly opt out of the obligation of confidentiality.145
Volokh justifies his approach by arguing that contract liability is not
an unconstitutional way to “stop people from speaking about me” but is
instead a permissible right to “stop people from violating their promises
to me.”146  He notes that enforcement of contract would “pose[ ] little
risk of setting a broad precedent for further restrictions [on free speech],
139. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
140. Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988).
141. Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 104, at 1057. R
142. Id. at 1057–58.
143. Id. at 1058.
144. Id. at 1059–60.
145. Id. at 1060.
146. Id. at 1061.
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precisely because it is founded only on the consent of the would-be
speaker.”147  In such a case, “the government is simply enforcing obliga-
tions that the would-be speaker has himself assumed.”148
The consensual waiver approach views a person’s consent to the
waiver of her First Amendment rights as dispositive for First Amendment
purposes.149  Contract and promissory estoppel thus do not trigger First
Amendment protection, because people voluntarily agree to speech re-
strictions.  As Charles Fried notes, “[t]he moral force behind contract as
promise is autonomy:  the parties are bound to their contract because
they have chosen to be.”150  Since First Amendment rights are alienable
(in contrast, for example, to the constitutional ban on slavery), consen-
sual waiver will invariably play a part in any approach to First Amendment
applicability.  Moreover, consensual waiver resonates with the important
strand of First Amendment theory that justifies free speech protection
based on the autonomy of individual speakers,151 and with the body of
theory and commentary recognizing a First Amendment “right not to
speak.”152
The consensual waiver approach has a great deal of merit.  Ulti-
mately, however, it cannot serve as a complete solution to the problem of
speech liability because it is underinclusive.  By focusing entirely on the
rights of speakers, the consensual waiver approach ignores the important
social interest of free speech that protects the rights of listeners.  Free
speech is not justified solely based on the autonomy of speakers, but also
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Although a person can waive her free speech rights, such waiver can be invalid if
made under duress or without being knowing and informed.  Yakima County (West Valley)
Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 858 P.2d 245, 258 (Wash. 1993) (“[C]ourts have
indicated that the criminal law standard of a waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently made might be applicable, and have required that, at the very least, the waiver
of a First Amendment right be knowing.”).  Courts generally scrutinize waivers of
constitutional rights more stringently than waivers of other interests.  According to the
Supreme Court, waivers of constitutional rights must be “clear and compelling.”  Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967).  Some courts “closely scrutinize waivers of
constitutional rights, and indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver.”  E.g.,
City of Glendale v. George, 256 Cal. Rptr. 742, 744 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 57 (1981).
151. See generally, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech
(1989) (articulating theory of First Amendment protection grounded in individual
liberty).
152. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom
of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960) (“[T]here are times and circumstances when States may not compel
members of groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified.”);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (finding unconstitutional compelled
disclosure of affiliation with groups); Haig Bosmajian, The Freedom Not to Speak 167–205
(1999) (collecting and discussing cases, articles, and other materials).
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on how it safeguards the vibrant public discourse essential to self-govern-
ance or the search for truth.  Most famously, the Supreme Court in
Sullivan described this interest as ensuring “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open” public debate.153  When individuals agree not to speak, even
where each individual choice might be made freely and autonomously,
such agreements can produce outcomes that are threatening to vigorous
public discourse.  A theory built exclusively around the waiver of constitu-
tional rights fails to account for this kind of threat to First Amendment
values.
At the doctrinal level, the consensual waiver approach’s focus on au-
tonomy fails to explain the problem of unconstitutional conditions.  For
instance, suppose the government offered to pay citizens $100 in ex-
change for not criticizing government policies.  From a pure autonomy
approach, those who accepted such a deal would have freely bargained
away their First Amendment rights to criticize the government.  But from
the perspective of the social interest in free speech, a valuable source of
potential criticism of the government would have been bought up by the
government in such a way as to skew, distort, and stifle public discourse.
Recognizing this problem, the Supreme Court has held in a series of
cases that the government may not condition certain waivers of constitu-
tional rights on the receipt of benefits.154  The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine has been criticized for being inconsistent and incoher-
ent,155 but it clearly reflects that even “consensual” waivers of
constitutional rights can threaten the First Amendment and trigger
heightened scrutiny.
Additionally, in the context of government employment, the Court
has applied the First Amendment to speech restrictions in the public sec-
tor workplace.  In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court applied a First
Amendment balancing test because the employee’s speech was of public
concern.156  As the Court declared in Connick v. Myers, “a State cannot
153. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
154. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001) (striking
down condition on use of federal funds for legal services that restricted challenges to
welfare laws); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking down
condition on receipt of public broadcasting funds that required recipients to refrain from
editorializing).  But see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (upholding regulation
prohibiting federal funds from being used by those who provide abortion counseling).
155. For example, Jason Mazzone notes that the Court has treated waiver of
constitutional rights quite inconsistently.  While the Court is highly protective of certain
waivers of First Amendment and other constitutional rights, it has provided hardly any
limitations on highly coercive waivers of rights in the criminal justice context.  In a plea
bargain, a criminal defendant relinquishes numerous constitutional rights in exchange for
fewer charges or a lighter sentence.  Courts have treated plea bargains akin to regular
contracts rather than applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which limits the
nature of what constitutional rights can be waived in agreements with the government.
Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 801, 801–04, 833–34 (2003).
156. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”157
One might claim that the cases involving unconstitutional conditions
and speech by government employees are wrongly decided.  Since First
Amendment rights are alienable, the argument goes, any consensual
waiver should be the end of the constitutional inquiry.  However, the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine addresses a serious threat to constitu-
tional rights that should not be ignored.  Treating the government and
private parties as equivalent overlooks the danger that the government
could use its vast resources to buy up constitutional rights.158  As
Kathleen Sullivan observes, unconstitutional conditions “can alter the bal-
ance of power between government and rightholders” and can “skew the
distribution of constitutional rights among rightholders because it neces-
sarily discriminates facially between those who do and those who do not
comply with the condition.”159
Consensual waiver thus provides only a partial and incomplete solu-
tion to the problem because it focuses exclusively on the individual inter-
ests promoted by free speech to the exclusion of any social interests.  It
thus fails to account for the potentially problematic imposition of govern-
ment power in certain forms of civil liability, even when parties consent to
speech restrictions.  Volokh himself acknowledges that “Cohen v. Cowles
Media does not decide to what extent the government, acting as contrac-
tor, may require people to sign speech-restrictive contracts as a condition
of getting data from the government itself.”160  He notes that the “ques-
tion raises thorny issues of unconstitutional conditions” and that the
Court has provided little guidance about how it should be resolved, but
Volokh then sets the issue aside without addressing it.161  For the consen-
sual waiver approach to work, however, this issue must be resolved.  Thus,
whether a party consents to waiving free speech rights, in and of itself,
cannot determine in all instances when civil liability should trigger the
First Amendment.  There are circumstances in which the enforcement of
formally consensual speech bargains might nevertheless threaten or cor-
rode the robust public discourse upon which a vibrant First Amendment
culture depends.
157. 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383
(1987) (“[I]t is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis
that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.”).
158. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413,
1413–21, 1451 (1989) (offering vigorous defense of doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions and arguing that government, because of its powerful and pervasive influence,
“poses greater danger than private parties of coercion, however defined”).
159. Id. at 1490 (emphasis omitted).
160. Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 104, at 1062. R
161. Id.
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C. The Nature of the Injury Approach
Some courts have attempted to look to the nature of the injury being
remedied by civil liability in order to determine whether to apply the
Cohen or Sullivan rules in a given case.  Under this approach, damages for
certain kinds of injuries are consistent with the First Amendment, while
others are not.  In Sullivan, the injury rectified by defamation law was
reputational.  By contrast, the Court in Cohen argued that Cohen was not
“attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the
strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim.”162  The
Court observed that “Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his repu-
tation or his state of mind.  He sought damages in excess of $50,000 for
breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earn-
ing capacity.”163
Several courts have looked to this passage in Cohen to conclude that
the nature of the injury sought to be remedied should determine
whether the First Amendment applies.  Under this theory, lawsuits seek-
ing remedies for certain kinds of harm create dangers to free speech akin
to those in Sullivan, and should thereby invoke First Amendment scru-
tiny.  For example, in Veilleux v. NBC, a misrepresentation case, the First
Circuit focused on the nature of the damages caused by defendant’s
speech, concluding that they were “pecuniary, not reputational.”164
Therefore, the Cohen rule rather than the Sullivan rule governed.  In
Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Services, Compuware contended that
Moody’s violated an implied contractual term to perform a credit rating
assessment diligently.165  The court concluded:  “While ostensibly
presenting a breach of contract claim, this argument is grounded in neg-
ligence, and amounts to nothing more than a backdoor attempt to re-
cover damages for the harm allegedly caused by Moody’s protected ex-
pression of its opinion of Compuware’s financial condition.”166  The
court therefore imposed the First Amendment requirements for defama-
tion, which mandated that Compuware prove actual malice.167  In Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the court rejected an attempt by the
plaintiff to recover “defamation-type” damages for the torts of breach of
loyalty and trespass.168  Although the court concluded that these torts
should fall under the Cohen rule, only non-defamation-like damages were
recoverable without triggering the First Amendment.169  As a district
court articulated the approach:
162. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
163. Id.
164. 206 F.3d 92, 128 (1st Cir. 2000).
165. 499 F.3d 520, 531 (6th Cir. 2007).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 194 F.3d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1999).
169. Id.
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Viewed in tandem, Hustler and Cohen divide claims against the
news media by categorizing the damages sought.  If a party seeks
damages for harm to reputation or state of mind, the suit can
only proceed if that party meets the constitutional requirements
of a defamation claim.  If a party seeks damages for non-reputa-
tional harms, which include lost jobs and diminished employ-
ment prospects, then the First Amendment does not bar suit as
long as the claims are brought under generally applicable
laws.170
In determining whether the First Amendment applies to civil liabil-
ity, the nature of the injury approach has the undeniable virtue of at-
tempting to avoid simplistic formalist solutions.  Instead, it draws on the
powerful realist insight of Sullivan that the risks of government censor-
ship should be assessed regardless of the precise form the censorship
might take.  It also helpfully suggests that different forms of liability
might produce different kinds of threats to free speech.
But, at least in its current form, the nature of the injury approach is
an incomplete solution to the problem of civil liability for speech.  This is
the case for at least two reasons.  First, although purporting to avoid for-
malism, attempts to distinguish cases on the basis of the nature of the
injury can, nevertheless, require a different kind of formalism that can
produce indeterminate outcomes.  Alan Garfield argues:  “This distinc-
tion between economic versus reputational damages . . . is unfortunately
specious.  Neither [Sullivan] nor its progeny make a distinction between
‘economic’ and ‘reputational’ damages, and such a distinction cannot be
reasonably sustained.”171  Garfield goes on to note that “[o]ne of the ob-
vious ways in which a defamatory remark can harm someone, particularly
a business, is by causing economic losses” and “the common law has long
recognized that economic losses are part and parcel of defamation in-
jury.”172  The nature of the injury approach relies on a dubious distinc-
tion between different kinds of injuries and does not provide a principled
or coherent way to determine when the First Amendment should apply to
civil liability.
Second, as currently articulated, the nature of the injury approach
does not tell us which kinds of injuries count and which do not for First
Amendment purposes.  Even if one could accurately identify different
theories of damages that different forms of civil liability remedy (for ex-
ample, economic, reputational, hedonic), the nature of the injury ap-
proach fails to explain why certain kinds of damages threaten the First
Amendment while others do not, other than to point back to Sullivan and
Cohen.  This merely begs the question.
170. Steele v. Isikoff, 130 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2000).
171. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen, supra note 59, at 1123. R
172. Id. at 1123–24.
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D. The Public Concern Approach
Another approach to determining when civil liability for speaking
should invoke First Amendment scrutiny is to look to the nature of the
speech for which liability is sought.  The rule would be that the First
Amendment applies to civil liability when the speech involves matters of
public concern.  Such an approach has foundations in current constitu-
tional jurisprudence.  For example, with regard to restrictions on speech
in the government employment context, speech “on a matter of public
concern” will trigger First Amendment scrutiny.173  In a different context,
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that the First Amendment applied to
a federal law creating liability for disclosing information with knowledge
that it was obtained by an illegal wiretap.174  The Court held that First
Amendment scrutiny applies when the information is of “public con-
cern.”175  The public concern approach is based on the rationale that
speech on matters of public concern is at the core of the First
Amendment because it relates to processes of self-governance.176
A focus solely on the type of information at issue, however, is flatly
inconsistent with current law.  The information involved in Cohen was of
great public concern, and Cohen would be wrongly decided under such
an approach.  The public concern approach would essentially resolve the
conflicting Sullivan and Cohen rules by privileging the former over the
latter.
More generally, a public concern approach provides too much First
Amendment protection at the cost of confidential relationships.  All con-
tracts between private parties involving any newsworthy information
would be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.  Public figures
would be dramatically restricted in their ability to establish contractual
arrangements, much more so than private figures.  Additionally, public
figures would find it more difficult to enforce confidential relationships
with doctors, lawyers, or other professionals.  Should the doctor of every
celebrity, public figure, or person of importance be protected by the First
173. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
174. 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (invalidating as applied to facts of case provision of
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2006)).
175. Id. at 534.
176. As discussed above, this inquiry was at the heart of the Court’s reasoning in
Sullivan.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  Moreover, prominent speech
theorists across the ideological spectrum have long endorsed the importance of speech on
matters of public concern as critically important to the democracy-reinforcing value of the
First Amendment.  See, e.g., Sunstein, Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 19, at R
34–38 (“The issue of constitutional validity [under the First Amendment] should be
assessed in Madisonian terms:  Do the rules promote greater attention to public issues?  Do
they ensure greater diversity of view?”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (noting First Amendment’s “central place
in our society” is attributable to “the importance of speech to democratic organization”);
supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. R
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Amendment when she discloses confidential information?  Should banks
and lawyers have First Amendment exceptions to their duties of confiden-
tiality whenever the information is of public concern?  This would mean
that in any prominent case, a lawyer might be able to disclose newsworthy
confidential information about her client.  Moreover, should the thief
who stole a public figure’s diary have a First Amendment right to speak
about it?  Clearly we recognize that even information of public concern
can be restricted from disclosure depending upon the context in which it
was obtained.  The problem with the public concern approach, then, is
that it provides too broad a scope of First Amendment protection.
E. The First Amendment Balancing Approach
A final approach that is sometimes advocated is that the First
Amendment should apply to all instances of civil liability.  Cases would be
resolved via balancing, though several different balancing approaches
have been proposed.  Courts could apply constitutional scrutiny on a
case-by-case basis, they could do so categorically across areas of law, or
they could apply the content-neutral balancing scheme of United States v.
O’Brien177 to all instances of civil liability.  We will address each of these
variants in turn.
Robert O’Neil calls for a form of categorical balancing in which the
First Amendment should apply to all forms of liability for speech, with
different rules applying for different areas of law.178  Under this ap-
proach, all libel cases would warrant one rule, while Cohen-style disclo-
sures of private information would warrant a different rule.  In each cate-
gory of law, however, O’Neil seems to argue that the balance be struck
with a firm thumb on the side of speech.179  O’Neil’s approach, however,
does not provide for nuanced balancing.  All contract and promissory es-
toppel situations are difficult to lump into a one-size-fits-all categorical
balance, especially since they come in a seemingly endless number of
forms and types.180
Other scholars have called for case-by-case balancing, in which each
instance of civil liability imposed for speech would be assessed on its own
merits under the First Amendment.  For instance, Lili Levi argues that
courts should analyze confidentiality contracts under the First
Amendment on a case-by-case basis, with a multi-factored test:  “(1) the
character of the source’s substantive information; (2) the source’s rea-
sons for leaking; (3) the relevance of the source’s identity; (4) the press’
reasons for disclosure; and (5) the nature of the relationship between the
177. 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
178. See generally O’Neil, supra note 4. R
179. See id. at 90, 119 (arguing for strong First Amendment protection of images
obtained in public place, and for media that inspires violent acts).
180. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 Yale
L.J. 943, 972–95 (1987) (cataloguing problems with balancing, especially where substantive
metric with which to strike balance is lacking).
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reporter and the source.”181  Although she develops this approach in the
context of confidentiality contracts involving the press, her logic could
plausibly extend to confidentiality contracts more broadly.
Subjecting all civil liability that implicates speech to case-by-case bal-
ancing would constitutionalize an extensive domain of private ordering.
Is it really feasible for courts to engage in constitutional balancing for
every contract, tort, and property right that has some impact on speech?
Clearly not.  Such a rule would be unworkable, because so much of what
we do, say, write, and agree to involves expression of one sort or another.
Moreover, balancing tests such as the one Levi proposes are quite contex-
tual, which can be effective for resolving many issues but comes at a cost
of creating indeterminacy.  Although contextual analysis might be worth
this cost in a number of circumstances, it might not be worth it in all
situations.  Since civil liability that implicates speech involves such an
enormous domain of social and economic activity, especially based on the
current broad conception of speech, a case-by-case balancing approach
would run the significant risk of creating too much indeterminacy and
uncertainty, making it hard for people to know if their basic agreements,
transactions, and property rights will be enforceable.
A third form of balancing would be to apply intermediate scrutiny
under United States v. O’Brien182 to all instances of civil liability for speak-
ing.  In O’Brien, the Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for the
burning of a draft card against a symbolic speech challenge by applying a
three-part test that required a (1) valid and important government inter-
est that was (2) unrelated to the suppression of speech and was (3) suffi-
ciently tailored so as not to unduly infringe upon First Amendment inter-
ests.183  At least one scholar has advocated applying O’Brien-style scrutiny
across the board to all civil liability for speech.184
But like other forms of balancing, the application of the O’Brien
framework to the speech-liability problem would prove unsatisfying.
First, O’Brien-style balancing would suffer from the same level of general-
ity problem that we discussed earlier in connection with the general ap-
plicability approach:  If we are to balance the First Amendment interest
against a private law speech restriction, we would need to know at what
level of generality we should assess the private law rule.185  Using the ex-
ample of a confidentiality agreement, would we look at each individual
agreement (recognizing that some agreements might create special dan-
gers to free speech), or all such agreements as a whole?  Like the gener-
ally applicable law approach, O’Brien (like existing balancing theories
181. Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons:  Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-
Source Relations, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 609, 715 (1991).
182. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
183. Id. at 377.
184. Bogen, supra note 59, at 205. R
185. Cf. supra notes 138–138 and accompanying text. R
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generally) does not provide any guidance about how to proceed with the
inquiry.
Second, and more fundamentally, an O’Brien approach would ask
the wrong questions about the problem of civil liability.  The O’Brien ap-
proach asks courts to balance a government interest that is unrelated to
the suppression of speech against a burdened speaker’s First Amendment
rights.  The O’Brien test is designed for situations (like draft card burn-
ing) where the government’s prosecution of a content-neutral law has the
incidental effect of restricting speech, not where individuals seek to en-
force rights and duties against other individuals.  It is unclear how this
approach would translate to the civil liability context.  In the civil liability
context, the idea of balancing a government interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech against the burden on the speaker makes no sense,
because the government generally has no interest in any particular case.
The government is generally not a party to either the agreement being
enforced or any litigation challenging it on First Amendment grounds.
The speech-restrictive motivation of the enforcement thus typically comes
not from the government but from private parties.  Moreover, civil liabil-
ity rules themselves are often not directly related to the suppression of
speech; rather, it is how particular private parties choose to use civil liabil-
ity rules that is.
As a result, the O’Brien standard contains no theory of which sorts of
civil liability are threatening to the First Amendment.  It does not tell us
anything about which sorts of private rules are “related to the suppression
of speech,” nor does it contain any theory about how and why such rules
should be classified. O’Brien would tell us to balance, but would give us
no terms or standards with which to balance.  An additional theory exter-
nal to the O’Brien model would be needed, and no such theory currently
exists.
Thus, like other forms of balancing, the O’Brien approach lacks nu-
ance and is poorly suited to situations where private parties use the law to
pursue their own ends.
III. A NEW APPROACH
When should civil liability trigger First Amendment protections?  De-
spite the array of approaches discussed in Part II, none provides a com-
plete or convincing answer to this question.  The generally applicable law
approach fails because it provides no metric to judge the level of general-
ity of a body of law, a question that drives the entire inquiry.  The consen-
sual waiver approach has considerable merit, but it cannot account for
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and leaves the potential for un-
derprotection of free speech.  The nature of the injury approach fails
because it makes an untenable distinction between types of damages.
The public concern approach is limited by its focus on the nature of the
information and its failure to take into account other considerations,
such as how the information is obtained.  The First Amendment balanc-
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ing approach would leave behind a morass of uncertainty and constitu-
tionalize an enormous domain of activity between private parties.  Is
there a better approach?  We contend that there is.
A. The Government Power Approach
When it comes to free speech and civil liability, we contend the key
issue is government power.  Of course, government power is involved to
some extent every time a legal rule is enforced.  The issue is thus not
whether any form of government power is being exercised, but which
kinds of government power are particularly dangerous and should be cur-
tailed as abridgements of free expression.  In the discussion that follows,
we specify the types of government power that should trigger First
Amendment protection and those that should not.  We suggest that when
government power is used to dictate the terms of civil duties not to speak
(what we call the “duty-defining power”), the special dangers of this
power warrant application of the First Amendment.  In contrast, when
private parties create the content of speech-restrictive rules, the First
Amendment should not apply.  In this Section, we describe these two
kinds of government power, explain why the duty-defining power is espe-
cially threatening to the First Amendment, show how to distinguish be-
tween duty-defining and non-duty-defining rules, and discuss how our ap-
proach relates to current notions of the state action doctrine.
1. Two Forms of Government Power Through Civil Liability. — The civil
liability system uses government power to enforce duties people owe to
each other.  Enforcement power is certainly significant in all its forms, for
it employs the government’s vast strength, resources, officials, and ma-
chinery.  Nevertheless, not all enforcement of duties is the same.  Some
forms of duty enforcement employ government power to shape social
conduct in ways defined by the state.  Other forms of duty enforcement
serve to lend government power to private parties to enforce aims they
have designed on their own accord.
One form of government power involved in the civil liability system is
what we call “duty-defining.”  By this, we mean the use of government
power to specify the content of duties that private actors owe to each
other.  When the government uses tort law to establish substantive rules
of social conduct that all members of society must follow, it is defining
the content of the duties owed.  The person subject to such a duty cannot
voluntarily escape from it unless she is released by another.  For example,
under the law of tort, Alice has a duty not to negligently injure Bill.  Alice
cannot escape this duty unless Bill waives it.  Likewise, Alice has a duty not
to defame Bill, a duty from which Alice cannot escape unless Bill allows
Alice to defame him.  The government, through statute or the civil liabil-
ity system, defines the nature and content of these duties.  In this way, the
civil liability system becomes a way for the government to regulate social
conduct by defining the duties and having private parties serve as civil
“prosecutors” to enforce them.
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The other form of government power, which we call “non-duty-defin-
ing,” merely establishes a machinery to facilitate relationships and com-
merce between parties who wish to create and enforce duties with each
other.  In such cases, the duties of relationships are established by private
parties between themselves, and the government merely stands behind
such agreements to give them binding force.  In these cases, the govern-
ment does not set the terms of the duties, but rather supports social inter-
actions by ensuring that transactions and agreements can be made and
enforced.  By creating a forum for people to resolve disputes with each
other, non-duty-defining power enables people to enforce promises and
agreements that would be weak and ineffectual without an enforcement
mechanism.  Private parties, to a large extent, define the content and sub-
stance of the duties owed to each other—not the government.  The gov-
ernment uses its power to enforce the duties that private parties have
created.
When civil liability rules restrict speech, we contend that duty-defin-
ing power should trigger the First Amendment, but non-duty-defining
power should not.  Civil liability implicates the First Amendment when
the government is mandating the duties not to speak that private parties
owe to each other.  If the government directly imposes a duty on a party
that others can sue the party for breaching and that the party cannot
escape from, then this is an imposition on that party’s First Amendment
rights.
a. Non-Duty-Defining Power. — Why should non-duty-defining power
be beyond the First Amendment?  One might contend that the govern-
ment should never use its power to facilitate people in alienating their
First Amendment rights, even when they do so freely.  To address this
objection, we must examine the justifications for free speech.  Although
many reasons behind the protection of free speech have been proposed,
they can be roughly divided into two types:  (1) “speaker-based,” in which
the value of the First Amendment is in protecting the speaker’s auton-
omy; and (2) “listener-based,” in which the First Amendment ensures
that ideas and viewpoints are expressed in public discourse.186
The classic statement of a listener-based regime is that of Alexander
Meiklejohn, who argued that “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying be said.”187  Meiklejohn’s concern
(like Madison’s before him) was to ensure that a sovereign people had
access to the ideas and information necessary for effective democratic
186. Prominent examples of speaker-based theories include Baker, supra note 151; R
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 594 (1982); David A.J.
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:  Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 62 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 215 (1972).  Examples of listener-based theories
include Madison, supra note 28, at 227; Meiklejohn, supra note 29, at 26; Sunstein, R
Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 19, at 34–35. R
187. Meiklejohn, supra note 29, at 25. R
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self-governance.188  Justice Souter’s dissent in Cohen makes similar lis-
tener-based arguments against the Cohen rule:  “[F]reedom of the press is
ultimately founded on the value of enhancing [public] discourse for the
sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self-
governed.”189
Although they are often mutually reinforcing, the speaker-based and
listener-based models come into conflict when a person voluntarily
desires to waive her free speech rights.  The speaker’s autonomy and free-
dom to trade away her right to speak clashes with society’s interest in
having the speech be part of public discourse.
The speaker-based model dominates First Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Under current law, First Amendment rights are not merely aliena-
ble by individual speakers; the decision not to speak is also a First
Amendment right.  Rooted in notions of the autonomy of individual
speakers, this right acts to prevent the government from coercing individ-
uals into saying more than they would prefer, or professing any idea or
belief with which they may disagree.190  In a pure listener-based model,
First Amendment rights would not be alienable, as this could deprive so-
ciety of speech that is of public concern.  Moreover, a pure listener-based
model would conceivably require the First Amendment to apply even in
the absence of state action.  This would be a radical shift in current First
Amendment law.
Although First Amendment jurisprudence is predominantly speaker-
based, it is not purely speaker-based.  Collective listener-based justifica-
tions often play an important role in First Amendment cases.  As we dis-
cuss in Part II.B when examining consensual waiver, significant constitu-
tional problems are likely to arise when the government uses its largesse
to induce citizens to voluntarily refrain from expressing certain view-
points or disseminating various forms of information.  Beyond such cases,
however, people retain a significant amount of freedom to determine
when and whether to speak.  For the most part, free speech rights are
alienable, and it is only when the government is inducing or unduly influ-
encing their alienation that the First Amendment comes into play.  To
188. Madison, supra note 28, at 227; Meiklejohn, supra note 29, at 25. R
189. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 678 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment is generally violated
where the state defines the content of a message and requires a speaker to utter it.  See,
e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (suggesting First
Amendment violation where “specific message is dictated by the state”); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715, 717 (1977) (holding state mandated license plates reading
“Live Free or Die” violated First Amendment); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding compelled flag salute by children violates First Amendment
rights not to speak).  See generally, Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory
Payments, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 123, 183 (1999) (“Where the government acts to manipulate
the marketplace of ideas, strict scrutiny applies unless the compelled expression falls into
the narrow category of factual disclosures imposed to enhance consumer information
. . . .”).
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the limited extent First Amendment jurisprudence protects the rights of
listeners, it does so only when the government is causing the alienation of
free speech rights, not when it is merely enforcing an alienation created
through private ordering.
With non-duty-defining power, the exercise of government power is
only possible if the speaker has voluntarily assumed a duty.  Dealings be-
tween private parties, not the government, establish the scope and con-
tours of the duty.191  The government’s role in shaping the speaker’s ex-
pression is thus secondary to that of the private parties, who have the
lion’s share of control over what can be said.
The First Amendment is primarily a limitation on government power
when it inhibits or tries to direct public discourse.  The First Amendment
certainly serves the goal of promoting public discourse, but it does so
primarily by protecting speakers against problematic exercises of govern-
ment power.  In other words, people are free to agree to be bound to
duties that limit their freedom of speech.  Because of this freedom, non-
duty-defining power differs fundamentally from duty-defining power.  In
the case of non-duty-defining power, the government is only using its
power to enforce a person’s own choice to alienate her free speech rights.
Moreover, the government is not playing a significant role in inducing a
person to alienate her rights; it is merely providing a mechanism to en-
force the alienation.  Private parties, through their own dealings, relation-
ships, and agreements, create duties to each other.  Non-duty-defining
power involves enforcing activities of private ordering.
b. Duty-Defining Power. — In contrast, in the case of duty-defining
power, the government is using its power to define when or how a person
can speak.  It is directing the shape and form of discourse.  This is the
kind of government power that is most pernicious, since the First
Amendment provides rights against government speech restrictions; its
goal is to keep the government from interfering in public discourse.
Duty-defining power identifies the real danger in the context of civil
liability for speech.  As the Supreme Court noted in Sullivan, the First
Amendment is principally concerned with restraining the government
from dictating, distorting, or suppressing the terms or content of public
discourse.192  As the court noted, what matters is whether the govern-
ment is seeking to coercively influence the debate, and not whether it is
doing so by putting its critics in jail or subjecting them to civil liability.  As
Justice Brennan observed in his majority opinion, “[t]he fear of damage
awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution
under a criminal statute.”193
191. An exception arises when the government is a party to the confidentiality
agreement or establishes a condition on information it divulges.  For a discussion of how
these situations fit into our theory, see infra Part III.A.3.
192. 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
193. Id. at 277.
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When the government uses its power to create civil liability for
speech, it can silence those with whom it disagrees in a number of differ-
ent ways.  The First Amendment has principally been concerned with the
use of prior restraints or subsequent criminal punishments to silence dis-
sent, but a creative government can use civil liability to produce an analo-
gous result.  For example, critics can be silenced by subjecting them to
tort liability,194 by bribing them into contractual silence,195 or by using
property law to create “free speech zones” and areas where public discus-
sion is not allowed.196  Tort, contract, and property rules negotiated by
private parties can certainly restrict speech, but the First Amendment is
particularly threatened when the sovereign itself is using these sources of
law to stifle public debate.  These are instances where the government
has defined civil duties, and it is for this reason that exercises of the duty-
defining power are especially dangerous to First Amendment values.
The duty-defining power’s threat to First Amendment values is ap-
parent under any of the traditional justifications for why free speech
should receive special protection.  From a listener-based perspective, this
is relatively straightforward.  If we are concerned with the public debate
necessary to support self-governance or the search for truth, then the gov-
ernment’s use of civil liability to influence these processes is problematic.
From a speaker-based perspective, duty-defining power interferes with
speaker autonomy by forcing a speaker to face potential liability for her
speech.
2. Why Power Is the Key Concept Rather than Consent. — The distinction
between duty-defining and non-duty-defining power overlaps to some de-
gree with the consensual waiver approach.  In many instances, duty-defin-
ing power involves duties that are not waivable and non-duty-defining
power involves duties that are waivable.  Our approach differs in a very
important respect from the consensual waiver approach.  With consen-
sual waiver, the operative concept is consent, and the approach focuses
exclusively on speaker autonomy.  If a speaker consents to waiving her
right to speak, and the consent is voluntary, then under the consensual
waiver approach, the First Amendment does not apply.  Although con-
sent is a key component in our government power approach, it is not the
governing concept.  We contend that the First Amendment must limit
problematic exercises of government power, and, in some instances, the
use of such power can occur with people’s consent.  For example, in our
critique of the consensual waiver approach, we discussed the hypothetical
situation of the government offering to pay people $100 not to criticize
government policies.  Such an arrangement would not be subject to the
First Amendment under the consensual waiver approach, as a payment of
194. E.g., id. at 301–02 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing
liability for defamation).
195. See discussion of unconstitutional conditions doctrine infra Part III.A.2.
196. For a comprehensive discussion of how the government can use property law to
suppress public discourse and political dissent, see Zick, supra note 102, at 117. R
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$100 is likely not coercive enough to render a person’s decision to avoid
criticizing the government involuntary.  Under the government power ap-
proach, however, the arrangement would be subject to First Amendment
scrutiny.  The arrangement is problematic not because of a lack of con-
sent but because of the way the government is exercising its power.  The
government commands tremendous resources, and it must be limited in
using these resources to skew public discourse.
The government power approach explains most coherently how
speaker-based and listener-based considerations are configured under
the First Amendment.  Although the First Amendment is predominantly
speaker-based, it is not exclusively so.  In certain instances, listener-based
considerations must be taken into account.  Existing theories of the First
Amendment often focus exclusively on speaker or listener interests, or
they fail to explain how to address situations where such interests conflict.
A purely listener-based First Amendment would override speaker auton-
omy in favor of mandating robust public discourse.  The First
Amendment is not a broad mandate forcing society to engage in public
discourse; rather, it is a protection against government power that im-
pedes such discourse.  A purely speaker-based First Amendment would
allow the government to use its nearly infinite resources to create power-
ful incentives to shape public discourse to suit its aims.  Such action by
the government would be immensely troublesome, even if speakers vol-
untarily bargained away their right to speak.  The unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine recognizes the need for limitations on the government’s
ability to induce people to surrender rights.
One could try to mold the consensual waiver approach to address
the problems of undue government influence over speech by concluding
that such influence is coercive and therefore makes such waivers of free
speech rights nonconsensual.  But this strategy would dramatically alter
current legal notions of consent, which typically require a high level of
coerciveness to deem an agreement involuntary.  The reason why the
First Amendment should require scrutiny when the government offers
people $100 not to say certain things is not because people lack the abil-
ity to consent to this arrangement.  It is because the government is med-
dling too extensively with public discourse.  This might not be a menace
to free speech from the speaker-based perspective, but it does threaten
free speech from the hybrid speaker-listener model that we (along with
the bulk of contemporary theory and doctrine) adopt.197  Although the
First Amendment should not prevent people from waiving their right to
speak in transactions with each other, it should be implicated when they
are waiving such rights at the instigation of the government.
Therefore, we propose that the key issue is one of government
power, and that the First Amendment should apply to civil liability when-
197. See supra notes 153–161 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes R
186–191. R
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ever it involves duty-defining power.  Focusing on government power is
the only coherent way to account for all of the various factors involved
when free speech is implicated by civil liability.
3. Distinguishing the Forms of Power. — If the exercise of a duty-defin-
ing power is the problem, how should it be identified?  We propose the
following approach: First Amendment scrutiny applies to civil liability restrict-
ing speech when (1) the government defines the content of the civil duty; and (2)
the speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty, or the government exercises undue
power in procuring the speaker’s acceptance. Conversely, when either of these fac-
tors is not present, the First Amendment would not apply to civil liability.
It is important to note that this rule only determines whether First
Amendment scrutiny should be applied.  Even if First Amendment scru-
tiny is applied, civil liability for speech can still pass constitutional muster
if it withstands the scrutiny.
Mandatory civil duties defined and imposed by the government
should generally trigger First Amendment scrutiny when they restrict
speech, because the government can create such duties as a way to har-
ness the civil liability system to expose speakers to liability risks.  By forc-
ing people to face massive litigation costs and dangers, the government
can inhibit speech. Sullivan presents the paradigmatic example.  That
case involved a government plaintiff (a public official) using civil liability
to punish people for speaking.  The speech in question was critical of the
public conduct of government officials.  The facts of the case demon-
strate (as the Court recognized) that libel law was being used as a tool of
censorship.198
By contrast, the First Amendment should not apply to civil liability
cases where the government does not define the duty.  If the duty is de-
fined in a contract between private parties, then this is a matter of dispute
between those private parties.  There is insufficient government involve-
ment in this situation to justify First Amendment scrutiny.  The govern-
ment power is just a tool being used by the private parties to carry out
their own self-defined ends.  The parties themselves have created and
agreed upon the duties, making the risks to First Amendment values re-
mote.  Private agreements can certainly affect public discourse in prob-
lematic ways, but the First Amendment is focused on the state and on
particularly threatening instances of state power over public discourse.
Where the government defines the content of the duties, there is a
greater exercise of government power.  But the government’s definition
of the duty alone is not dispositive.  The second prong of our approach
looks to whether the speaker can avoid being subjected to the duty.  If the
speaker can, then the ultimate control is in the speaker’s hands, not the
government’s.
An example of duties that speakers can voluntarily avoid is contrac-
tual default rules.  This exercise of government power is ameliorated by
198. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. R
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the fact that the speaker can change the way that the government has
defined the duties imposed upon her.  The government may enforce bar-
gains, but those bargains are the product of the expectations that individ-
uals have in their social relationships.  For suits involving civil liability
where private agreements of this kind are involved, government power
does not rise to a sufficiently problematic level to trigger First
Amendment scrutiny.
Of course, the government can certainly influence the shape of du-
ties private parties establish amongst each other by setting default rules.
Many default rules are relatively easy to bargain around, and these do not
rise to the level of duty-defining.  If, however, a default rule is particularly
onerous to change, then it might rise to the level of duty-defining.  The
line between duty-defining and non-duty-defining rules may not be per-
fect, but we contend that it is not only clearer than the alternative ap-
proaches we discussed above, but also more directly related to the critical
First Amendment values at stake in the civil liability context.
A key form of non-duty-defining power is the enforcement of express
or implied conditions on speaking about information gleaned from
others.  People share information with each other with the understand-
ing that it will not be further disseminated.  A person could readily avoid
the duty by not accepting the information.  One might object that with-
out learning about the information, the speaker would not be able to
then speak about that information.  The speaker’s speech is thus depen-
dent upon hearing the information, and to do so, the speaker must ac-
cept a duty not to disclose it.  This puts the speaker in a Catch-22
situation.
To respond to this objection, it is useful to draw upon the concept of
unjust enrichment.  Speakers whose speech is only possible by violating
express or implied promises not to disclose information are taking advan-
tage of a form of unjust enrichment.  Some speech is based upon infor-
mation gleaned from others, and it would not be possible to speak about
certain things without obtaining this information.  According to the
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment:  “A person who is un-
justly enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the
other.”199  The Restatement commentary explains:
The source of a liability in restitution is the receipt of an eco-
nomic benefit under circumstances such that its retention with-
out payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defen-
dant at the expense of the plaintiff.  The consequence of a
liability in restitution is that the defendant must either restore
the benefit in question (or its traceable product), or else pay
money in the amount necessary to eliminate unjust
enrichment.200
199. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 (Discussion
Draft, 2000).
200. Id. at § 1 cmt. a.
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Speech that would not be possible without obtaining information
from another is akin to unjust enrichment.201  Enforcing promises not to
disclose information provided by others only limits the speaker from say-
ing things she would not be able to say without making the promise of
confidentiality.  For example, suppose Bob wants to hear Alice’s secret
story about her life.  Bob promises Alice that he will never disclose her
story to others.  Alice then tells Bob the story.  Bob then breaks his prom-
ise and publishes Alice’s story.  Alice sues Bob for violating his promise.
In this example, a duty of confidentiality has arisen from Alice and Bob’s
dealings.  Bob could have avoided the duty by not listening to Alice’s se-
cret.  He made a voluntary choice to learn the information.  Alice told
him her story because of his promise not to speak about it.  Bob could
not write about Alice’s story unless he learned it from Alice, and he had
to promise Alice confidentiality in order to hear it.  Bob’s speech is the
product of unjust enrichment.  Enforcing the promise does not stop Bob
from saying anything except what he would have been unable to say with-
out the promise.  Enforcing the promise, therefore, is not restricting
Bob’s right to speak beyond what he could have said before making the
promise in the first place.
It is important not to read this exception too broadly.  The unjust
enrichment approach does not apply to every condition that the govern-
ment might place on the exchange of the information.  It merely applies
to conditions that restrict only the use of the specific information the
parties have exchanged.  Any government-imposed condition that ex-
tends beyond the use of the specific information that the parties have
exchanged (e.g., a condition not to criticize the government or to vote a
certain way) would be a duty-defining rule and thus subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.
Therefore, when analyzing whether the speaker can avoid accepting
the duty or whether the government exercises undue power in procuring
the speaker’s acceptance, it is important to consider whether the duty is
restricting what the speaker could have said prior to accepting the duty.
In other words, some speech is only possible because the speaker either
expressly or impliedly accepts a duty.  In these cases, the speaker suffers
no net loss in the right to speak, for the duty only extends to speech that
involves information procured by the assumption of the duty itself.
4. State Action. — At this point, one might wonder how our approach
differs from the state action doctrine, for one could understand the state
action doctrine as also turning on government power.  State action and
the imposition of First Amendment scrutiny, however, involve different
issues.  The state action doctrine establishes whether a sufficient involve-
ment of government power exists to provide standing for parties to bring
201. Of course, it follows that, if the matter being spoken about is learned
independently from the promise of confidentiality, then no unjust enrichment from
speaking of or disclosing the information exists.
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constitutional claims.202  The government power approach that we de-
velop in this Article seeks to identify those instances where government
power triggers First Amendment scrutiny.  This is a more narrowly cir-
cumscribed area than that delineated by the state action doctrine.  There
are many instances of state action that do not involve an exercise of gov-
ernment power that should concern the First Amendment.
State action doctrine reflects the idea that because the Constitution
binds only the state—and not private parties—only actions by the govern-
ment (or those acting at its direction) can give rise to constitutional
claims.  Cases finding state action tend to fall into three groups:  (1) cases
where private actors have assumed a “public function;” (2) fact-specific
cases where the state is entangled with or participating in actions of a
private actor; and (3) cases where the state has encouraged private ac-
tion.203  State action doctrine is famously indeterminate—as Charles
Black put it, “a conceptual disaster area.”204  For example, the operation
of company towns involves a private party assuming a “public function”
and thus triggers state action, but company-owned public utilities do
not.205
Our approach differs from state action doctrine because it is necessa-
rily narrower and avoids much of the indeterminacy of current state ac-
tion doctrine.  State action seeks to identify all instances where power is
attributable to the government.  It thus encompasses a wide range of in-
stances of government power, including both duty-defining and non-
duty-defining power.  Our approach is focused not merely on whether
power is attributable to the government, but on the nature of that power.
Only the exercise of the duty-defining power triggers the First
Amendment.
It is noteworthy that, in Cohen, the Court held that there was state
action.  The Court concluded that whenever “legal obligations would be
enforced through the official power of . . . courts,” this “is enough to
constitute ‘state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”206
Such a broad statement of the state action doctrine would render the
judicial enforcement of every legal rule to be state action.207  What mat-
202. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1543 (6th ed. 2009).
203. See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 387, 412–13 (2003) (discussing various strands of state action doctrine as
delineated by Supreme Court cases).
204. Charles Black, Jr., Foreword:  “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967).
205. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (company town), with
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (public utility).
206. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991).
207. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1948) (holding enforcement of private
racially restrictive covenant to be state action in violation of Fourteenth Amendment).
Such a broad statement of the law can be inferred from some of the cases, but is not borne
out by the results of most state action doctrine cases.  See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (noting “[m]ere acquiescence” of state to private action does not
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ters for the purposes of First Amendment applicability, however, is not
whether there is state action, but whether the state action that is present
every time a court enforces a judgment infringes upon rights protected
by the First Amendment.  State action doctrine does not tell us the an-
swer to this question.
In any given case, we contend there are three distinct considerations
when analyzing whether a particular instance of civil liability constitutes a
First Amendment violation.  First, there must be state action, at least in
the broadest sense.  The purpose of this inquiry is to distinguish between
purely private conduct and conduct with government involvement.  The
holdings in Sullivan, Cohen, and dozens of other cases demonstrate the
most coherent and intellectually honest approach:  Every time the civil
liability system is used for enforcement, the power of the state is invoked,
and state action exists.  This inquiry should be a fairly easy hurdle to sur-
mount.  Treating state action in this way clears away the conceptual un-
dergrowth to reveal the real question of whether the First Amendment
applies to the enforcement of civil liability judgments by courts.
The second (and more difficult) question is whether the First
Amendment applies to the state action in question.  In contrast to the
question of whether state action exists, the question of First Amendment
applicability asks whether the state action that is always present in the civil
liability system has been exercised in a way that threatens or implicates
the First Amendment.  Our approach in distinguishing between duty-de-
fining power and non-duty-defining power aims to add clarity and coher-
ence to this determination.
If the First Amendment applies, then a third question arises:  Does
the type of civil liability in question survive First Amendment scrutiny?
To answer this question, the Supreme Court undertakes what is often re-
ferred to as “balancing”—analyzing a particular exercise of government
power with strict or intermediate scrutiny, and, if necessary, crafting spe-
cial limiting rules such as the actual malice rule for public figures in defa-
mation actions.208  In this Article, we do not address how various types of
civil liability should fare under First Amendment scrutiny, as the results
will often vary depending upon the circumstances.
For the reasons given above, we think the distinction between duty-
defining and non-duty-defining rules does helpful work in the context of
the problem of free speech and civil liability.  By focusing on the First
Amendment’s special protections against the use of government power to
structure public debate, our approach is both faithful to orthodox under-
create state action).  But see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 (1982)
(holding that “invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created
attachment procedures” constitutes state action).  Ultimately, all of these cases suggest the
rampant indeterminacy and theoretical confusion in state action doctrine and its
unsuitability as the basis for any principled line articulating the contours of First
Amendment applicability to civil liability.
208. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
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standings of the core of what the First Amendment protects, and allows us
to identify and separate the cases where the government is using the civil
liability system in ways that are especially dangerous.
B. Civil Liability and First Amendment Scrutiny
Having stated the general rule, it is helpful to set forth some exam-
ples of its application.  We envision that our test would generally (though
not always) lead to First Amendment scrutiny for tort and property law
rules that restrict speech, and would generally (though not always) avoid
First Amendment scrutiny of contract rules.  Because, as we note above,
the boundaries between these areas of the law are indistinct, an examina-
tion of each of them helps illustrate the outcomes that we anticipate our
test would produce.
1. The Defamation Torts. — The government power approach would
generally (though not always) impose First Amendment scrutiny on tort
law rules that restrict speech because the government defines the duty for
most torts.  For example, defamation law contains state-mandated duties
not to speak falsehoods that harm people’s reputations.  The government
has defined the duty, and the speaker cannot avoid being subjected to it.
By creating a liability rule for speech, the government has created the
same risk of indirect censorship of debate as in Sullivan.  The First
Amendment should therefore apply to scrutinize (though not necessarily
invalidate) the rule.
2. The Breach of Confidentiality Tort. — Although the government
power approach generally would impose First Amendment scrutiny for
tort rules that restrict speech, there are notable exceptions.  In tort law,
speakers can often avoid being subjected to tort duties.  In some cases, for
example, tort law provides only de facto default rules, which speakers can
very readily bargain around.  This is the case with the breach of confiden-
tiality tort.  Confidentiality is a default duty.  Speakers can avoid liability
under the tort by simply disavowing any duty of confidentiality at the time
they are about to learn the information.209  In other words, if John is
about to tell Jane a secret, and Jane says that she will not keep it confiden-
tial, but John tells her the secret anyway, Jane would not incur any liability
for breach of confidentiality if she disclosed it.  John can no longer ex-
pect confidentiality when Jane has explicitly disavowed any assumed or
expected duties to maintain the confidence.
Of course, not all default duties are easy to bargain around.  If a
default duty is very difficult to change, the government is exercising un-
due power in procuring a speaker’s acceptance, and the power is duty-
defining.  The key question is the extent to which the government is us-
209. See Vickery, supra note 107, at 1456–58 (discussing elements of breach of R
confidentiality tort and noting that “general duty” of confidentiality exists either when
reasonable person would have understood information received to be confidential or
when recipient expressly or impliedly consented to keep information confidential).
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ing its power to define what the speaker can and cannot say.  How much
of a role is the government playing in defining the speaker’s speech, and
how much of a role is the speaker playing in subjecting herself to limita-
tions and duties to others?  With the breach of confidentiality tort, the
speaker still retains a large degree of control.  Moreover, the speaker’s
disclosure of confidential information is akin to an unjust enrichment
insofar as the speaker falsely promised confidentiality in order to learn
the information.210
There are instances, though, where the duty of confidentiality is im-
plied rather than express.  Suppose a patient tells her doctor that she has
a disease.  The doctor never expressly promises to keep it confidential,
and the doctor then blogs about the patient’s disease.  The patient sues
under the breach of confidentiality tort.  Under one theory, a promise of
confidentiality is implicit.  If the doctor knew the patient divulged the
information about her disease because the patient believed the doctor
would keep it confidential, then the doctor could have readily corrected
the patient’s misunderstanding before learning the secret.  Under an-
other theory, the doctor’s duty of confidentiality might be based on pro-
fessional ethical rules.  To the extent that these rules are established by
the state, the government is defining the nature of the duty.  Yet the con-
cept of unjust enrichment still applies because the doctor would not be
able to disclose the patient’s disease without the patient first telling the
doctor about it, and the patient only disclosed her disease on the premise
that the doctor had a duty of confidentiality.  In other words, the duty
only restricts speech that is made possible in large part because of the
duty itself.
If civil liability extends to speech that does not involve the specific
facts divulged under a duty of confidentiality, then the situation is differ-
ent.  But liability for speech that involves only facts obtained because of
the acceptance of a duty does not involve a pernicious exercise of govern-
ment power.  Imposition of the duty does not deprive the speaker of the
ability to say anything beyond the information the speaker obtained be-
cause his confidant relied on the assumption that the speaker was under
a duty of confidentiality.
3. Trespass. — Our theory differs from the way current case law ad-
dresses property rights and free speech.211  Suppose a homeowner seeks
to enforce a trespass law to prevent people from protesting on her lawn
because she does not like the content of their message.  Under our ap-
proach, the duty not to trespass is defined by the government, and the
speaker cannot avoid the imposition of the duty.  Therefore, the First
Amendment should apply to trespass actions that implicate speech.
The applicability of the First Amendment, however, does not mean
that it must bar the enforcement of trespass by a homeowner.  In this
210. See supra Part III.A.3.
211. See supra Part I.B.2.
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context, a categorical balancing could readily be performed to conclude
that all instances where a homeowner seeks to enforce trespass against a
speaker would pass First Amendment scrutiny.  First, the state has a com-
pelling government interest in protecting the sanctity and privacy of peo-
ple’s homes, even from protected First Amendment speech.  This interest
has been characterized as one of “comfort and convenience,”212 but it
can have a First Amendment magnitude as well.  At a minimum, enforce-
ment of the norm of residential privacy implicates the right not to lis-
ten,213 but it also allows the generation of new ideas and potentially new
speech through the protection of a zone of intellectual privacy.214  Sec-
ond, in most cases, speakers will have alternative channels for expression,
such as places nearby the homeowner’s property.  Whereas the defama-
tion torts, privacy torts, and other torts apply to speakers wherever they
are, the enforcement of private property rights only applies within a very
small area—the geographical boundaries of the property at issue.
The outcome would be radically different if the government were to
pass a law prohibiting door-to-door solicitations,215 use zoning law to cre-
ate “free speech zones,”216 or use the police power to ban residential
signage or other expressive uses of private property.  As in the above case
of a run-of-the-mill trespass action, the First Amendment would apply, but
in these latter cases there would be no countervailing interest justifying
the speech restriction, as the Supreme Court itself pointed out in the case
of City of Ladue v. Gilleo.217  These situations would therefore likely not
survive First Amendment scrutiny.
We thus diverge from the current jurisprudence, which finds no state
action in cases enforcing private trespass laws.  It is incoherent to claim
that state action exists when the civil liability system is used to enforce
most torts and contracts yet does not exist when the system is used to
212. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
213. Id. at 86–87.
214. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 387 (2008)
(arguing that generation of new ideas requires meaningful privacy protections for pre-
speaking activities of thinking, reading, and consultation with intimates).
215. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002) (finding village ordinance restricting noncommercial door-to-door
canvassing insufficiently narrowly tailored to protection of residents’ privacy interest);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (“The dangers of distribution can so
easily be controlled by traditional methods . . . that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution . . . .”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115–17 (1943) (finding municipal ordinance requiring commercial door-to-door
canvassers to obtain license or pay tax insufficiently narrowly tailored).
216. See Zick, supra note 102, at 105 (noting increased use of expressive zoning but R
referring to Supreme Court’s observation that one cannot “have the exercise of his liberty
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place” (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939))).
217. 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994); accord Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 519–20 (1981) (finding no strong government interest in aesthetics or traffic safety to
justify prohibiting most noncommercial billboards).
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enforce torts protecting property.  The problem is that courts often con-
flate the question of the existence of state action with later steps in the
analysis such as whether the First Amendment applies and whether it is
violated.  There is state action in these cases, and the First Amendment
applies and provides protection.  Our approach is more intellectually
honest.  Rather than hiding behind the incoherent determination that
state action does not exist, our approach acknowledges that the use of
property law to exclude speakers implicates the First Amendment, but
that the First Amendment and other social interests on the part of the
homeowner outweigh the interests of the trespasser.  This could be a cate-
gorical determination for all instances where these values are opposed.
In contexts where different values are involved, different outcomes might
apply.  Thus, in the case of shopping malls, the interests in residential
convenience and intellectual privacy would be less robust or missing alto-
gether.  Although we do not insist that the shopping mall cases are neces-
sarily incorrect, our approach would focus on the First Amendment and
other social values present on either side of the equation.
4. Restrictive Covenants. — What, then, about Shelley v. Kraemer?218 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that imposing a private restrictive cov-
enant (a property rule enforceable through trespass) that limits owner-
ship of property based on race both implicates and violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.219 Shelley is best understood not as a state ac-
tion case but rather as a Fourteenth Amendment case.  Every judicial de-
cree might be state action, but only judicial decrees creating special
Fourteenth Amendment dangers violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Looking at the question from the perspective of substantive Equal
Protection law, the Court correctly determined that a system of judicially
enforceable property rules restricting houses to members of certain races
is threatening to the guarantee of Equal Protection.  The key to the case
is not that there was state action because a judge enforced an order, but
that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because a judge enforced
an order that enmeshed the state in a system of racial segregation in
housing.  Put in this context, the covenants in Shelley are revealed as a
direct threat to a core Equal Protection interest.
In the free speech/civil liability context, our government power ap-
proach would make an analogous inquiry.  As with Shelley, the fact of judi-
cial enforcement would be irrelevant; the relevant question would be
whether the system of rules being enforced was threatening to First
Amendment values.  In the context of civil liability rules, we argue that
the relevant question is whether the government is defining the duty not
to speak, because it is this form of government power that implicates core
First Amendment values.  Because the government does not dictate the
substantive content of typical restrictive covenants, enforcement of such a
218. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
219. Id. at 19–20.
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private agreement would be a use of the non-duty-defining power and
therefore would not implicate the First Amendment.
From a broader perspective, we can see why state enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants threatens the Fourteenth Amendment but
state enforcement of speech-restrictive covenants does not threaten the
First.  It is hard to imagine racial equality without equal access to housing.
State enforcement of private agreements to discriminate thus cuts much
closer to the core of the Fourteenth Amendment than state enforcement
of private agreements not to speak cuts to the core of the First.  As noted
above, when used by homeowners, trespass law does not threaten the First
Amendment, because it has limited geographic scope, leaves ample alter-
native grounds for expression, is enforced without reference to speech,
and actually supports the First Amendment right of the homeowner not
to listen.  A First Amendment analogue to Shelley would instead be
Alabama’s system of defamation in Sullivan, which allowed the state to
punish opinions and trivial falsehoods merely because it disagreed with
their message.
5. Nondisclosure Agreements Between Private Parties. — When private
parties enforce nondisclosure agreements, the non-duty-defining power is
being exercised.  As William Prosser famously put it:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in
the nature of the interests protected.  Tort actions are created to
protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm.  The
duties of conduct which give rise to them are imposed by the
law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessa-
rily upon the will or intention of the parties. . . . Contract ac-
tions are created to protect the interest in having promises per-
formed.  Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct
of the parties manifesting consent, and are owed only to the spe-
cific individuals named in the contract.220
Any government enforcement of these rules is incidental to the pri-
vate speech restriction, and would not normally create Sullivan-style risks
of censorship.  First Amendment scrutiny in the ordinary contract case
would thus be unnecessary.
We should be clear at this stage that many contracts between private
parties can be highly coercive or unconscionable.  Nothing in our ap-
proach would prevent courts from invalidating such contracts based on
duress, unconscionability, or contravention of public policy.  The free
speech effects of contracts could certainly be a valid public policy reason
to render them unenforceable.  This would be an issue for contract law,
not the First Amendment.  But by marking a clearer boundary between
First Amendment law and contract law for private-sector speech restric-
tions, our approach would focus the First Amendment on government-
defined civil duties, and make clear that it would be inapplicable to pri-
vately defined duties.  And where such duties would be threatening to
220. Prosser, Handbook, supra note 89, § 92, at 613. R
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free discussion, our approach would represent an invitation to contract
law to fix the problem itself.  First Amendment law should focus on
resolving problems between the individual and the state.  Contract law is
better at resolving conflicts between individuals, even when they involve
speech.
6. Contracts Between the Government and Private Parties. — Contract and
promissory estoppel, while generally not triggering First Amendment
scrutiny, will sometimes do so.  The unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine—as well as contracts by government employers that involve
speech221—presents vexing issues that have long confounded constitu-
tional law jurisprudence.  How should the government power approach
deal with situations involving the government enforcing contracts?
Under our approach, when the government seeks to enforce a non-
disclosure agreement, it is directly exercising its power, not just providing
the system by which other parties enforce their agreements.  However,
government employees or recipients of government benefits can avoid
the duty by not accepting such employment or benefits.  Although the
duty can be avoided by the speaker, the government’s direct involvement
in the process is a much more problematic exercise of government power
than when a private party is enforcing the duty.  Although private sector
employers can contract with individuals to forgo rights in exchange for
benefits or employment without triggering First Amendment scrutiny, the
government stands in different shoes than private sector employers.  The
government has vast resources and can use its largesse to buy up individ-
ual rights.  It can often exercise undue power in procuring the speaker’s
acceptance of the duty.  This power is not necessarily undue because it is
too coercive, but because it has the potential to be so widespread and
threatening to free discourse given the government’s immense resources.
We therefore conclude that under the government power approach, the
enforcement of government contracts limiting the free speech of individ-
uals should generally be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
There should be one exception, however, when the enforcement of
contracts made by the government affecting free speech rights should not
trigger First Amendment scrutiny:  when the government is seeking to
control the use of resources or information it provides.  Government
agencies handling personal data or classified information often need to
ensure that employees maintain confidentiality.  The government may
also provide data or funding for specific purposes and may want to pre-
vent it from being used for other purposes.  We propose that, in these
cases, concepts from the unjust enrichment law can be borrowed.  If the
restriction requires forgoing the use of a benefit or information that an
221. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 881, 925 (discussing whether leaks by government officials implicate First
Amendment or are “simply contractual breaches”); Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 197, 201–02 (2008) (questioning strength of President’s confidentiality
interest in communications with his advisors).
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individual would not have but for the government’s providing it, then
First Amendment scrutiny should not be triggered.  First Amendment
scrutiny should apply if the government demands, in exchange for em-
ployment or benefits, that a party forgo speaking on matters that he
could have spoken about even without receiving any information or bene-
fit from the government.
Applied to government confidentiality rules, the concept of unjust
enrichment views information procured by a promise subsequently vio-
lated as a good that was improperly obtained.  Since the individual’s
speech is based upon information that the individual would not possess
without making the promise, the speech is created at the expense of this
breach of promise.  In Cohen, the Court hinted at this justification by con-
tending:  “Unlike the situation in Florida Star, where the rape victim’s
name was obtained through lawful access to a police report, respondents
obtained Cohen’s name only by making a promise that they did not
honor.”222
This can be viewed as a situation of unjust enrichment:  It would be
unjust to allow a person to spread information that she would not have
obtained without an express or implied assumption of a duty of confiden-
tiality.  If we do not protect confidentiality, the speaker is unjustly en-
riched.  The speech that violates confidentiality often would not have
been possible without breaching an implicit or explicit promise of
confidentiality.
For example, our approach would not impose First Amendment
scrutiny in cases where the government seeks to enforce a confidentiality
agreement with a government employee.  Suppose the CIA sought to en-
force a confidentiality agreement against an employee who wanted to re-
veal classified information.  Enforcing this agreement should not involve
First Amendment scrutiny.  The facts of this hypothetical are somewhat
similar to Snepp v. United States, where the CIA sought to enforce a confi-
dentiality agreement that required employees to obtain the CIA’s consent
before revealing classified information or certain other information.223
In particular, the agreement provided that an employee “not . . . publish
. . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or
intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his]
employment . . . without specific prior approval by the Agency.”224  Frank
Snepp, a former CIA agent, published a book about his experiences at
the CIA without submitting it for prepublication review.  The Court en-
forced the agreement, addressing the First Amendment issues in a foot-
note.  The Court concluded that Snepp “voluntarily signed the agree-
ment” and that even under First Amendment scrutiny, the
“[g]overnment has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy
222. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991).
223. 444 U.S. 507, 507–08 (1980).
224. Id. at 508 (quoting confidentiality agreement).
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of information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelli-
gence service,” and the agreement “is a reasonable means for protecting
this vital interest.”225
Snepp’s manuscript, however, did not contain any classified informa-
tion—a fact the government conceded.226  It is not clear from the case
whether Snepp would have known the information in the book without
his signing the confidentiality agreement.  The dissent noted that not
only did the government concede that the information was not classified,
the government also appeared to concede that it was not confidential and
was in fact already available to the public.227  If the book discussed infor-
mation Snepp learned while at the CIA that would not otherwise have
been available to him, then under our approach, there should be no First
Amendment scrutiny.  The contract, however, was far too broad, as it pur-
portedly applied to anything an employee or former employee published
that “related to” the CIA rather than confidential or classified informa-
tion obtained while working at the CIA.  Our approach would apply First
Amendment scrutiny to the enforcement of the contract when it related
to information Snepp published about the CIA that was not confidential
or classified.
7. Government Benefits with Speech-Restrictive Conditions. — The govern-
ment also releases information subject to speech-restrictive conditions in
cases unrelated to government employment.  When would the enforce-
ment of such conditions trigger First Amendment protection?  The key
factor in these cases should be whether the speaker is losing any rights
that she would have had prior to the employment or receipt of a benefit.
For example, in LAPD v. United Reporting Publishing Co., the Court
upheld a California statute that required individuals seeking to access ar-
restee and victim records to declare under penalty of perjury that the
information “shall not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or
service to any individual or group of individuals.”228  The Court con-
cluded that the law was not “prohibiting a speaker from conveying infor-
mation that the speaker already possesses” but was merely “a governmen-
tal denial of access to information in its possession.”229  Since the
government had no duty to disclose the information, it was merely impos-
ing a condition in order for people to access it.  Such conditions would
not trigger First Amendment scrutiny under our approach.  The only lim-
itations on their speech that recipients of the data were agreeing to were
limitations on their use of the government data.
225. Id. at 509 n.3.
226. Id. at 510.
227. Id. at 516 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(f)(3) (West 2008); LAPD v. United Reporting Publ’g
Co., 528 U.S. 32, 35 (1999).
229. LAPD, 528 U.S. at 40.
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An example of where our approach would find the First Amendment
to be implicated is Rust v. Sullivan.230  In Rust, family planning service
counselors in clinics receiving federal funds were restricted from counsel-
ing about abortion as a way of family planning.231  The Court rejected a
First Amendment challenge, concluding that the government was merely
“selectively fund[ing] a program to encourage certain activities it believes
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alterna-
tive program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.”232
Under our approach, Rust should trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
This is one of only a few cases where we diverge from existing Supreme
Court doctrine.  In Rust, the government, as a condition of accepting its
funds, was making recipients forgo speaking about matters they could
have spoken about prior to the receipt of the funds.  This is different
from confidentiality agreements, which restrict parties from speaking
about information that they would not be able to speak about without
first gaining access to that data.  Moreover, the situation in Rust involves
more than merely selective funding of a program.  The government can
put limits on the use of the funds it gives out, so if counseling about
abortion would not have been possible without the funding, then such a
limitation would not trigger First Amendment scrutiny under our ap-
proach.  But if counseling about abortion were something that a program
could already engage in but would have to forgo in order to get the
funds, then the government would be using the funds to deprive the pro-
gram of existing rights.
Our approach allows government some room to function similarly to
private sector employers without invoking First Amendment scrutiny,
such as by using confidentiality agreements.  But it prevents government
from acting in its capacity as employer, benefit giver, or user of the civil
liability system to impact the preexisting way that people exercise their
First Amendment rights.  The situations where we conclude no First
Amendment scrutiny should apply involve instances where people are
merely limited in speaking about something they would not be able to
speak about but for the government’s sharing information with them.  It
is when government uses its power to require people to sacrifice their
current ability to speak that such power becomes problematic enough to
warrant First Amendment scrutiny.
8. Federal Trade Commission Fines for Privacy Policy Violations. — Most
major companies, especially those that do business on the Internet, have
a privacy policy in which they specify how they use personal information,
and under what circumstances they share that information with third par-
ties.  In a number of cases, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
brought actions against companies for violating their stated privacy poli-
230. 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991).
231. Id. at 177–78.
232. Id. at 193.
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cies.233  All the FTC cases have settled thus far, and there has not been a
First Amendment challenge to FTC enforcement actions for privacy pol-
icy violations.
Suppose the FTC seeks a fine against a company that breached confi-
dentiality by leaking information in violation of its privacy policy.  Does
this trigger First Amendment scrutiny?  The answer would depend upon
whether the provision of the privacy policy was voluntarily established by
the company or was a provision mandated by law.  If the provision was the
company’s own statement, then even though the government is the plain-
tiff, the content of the duty was defined and voluntarily assumed by the
company.  The First Amendment would not apply under our approach.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have attempted to resolve the conceptual tension
resulting from the application of the First Amendment to civil liability.
Current First Amendment law and theory has failed to articulate in a sys-
tematic and compelling way why the First Amendment should apply to
certain kinds of civil liability but not to others.  To remedy this confusion,
we offer a new theory of the First Amendment and civil liability:  one
focusing on the First Amendment dangers of government power to pre-
scribe liability rules.  We think that this approach makes two significant
contributions—one theoretical and one practical.
At the level of theory, we think our approach provides a better expla-
nation of when and why the First Amendment should apply to civil liabil-
ity, and of when and why it should not.  Although our solution explains
the bulk of the current cases, it is not offered as merely a descriptive
explanation for the status quo, but rather as a normative theory that ex-
plains and justifies a range of case outcomes that we think are consistent
with traditional scholarly understandings of why we should protect free
speech.
Our solution will likely not be perfect.  Every legal rule faces hard
cases, and we harbor no illusions that our approach to civil liability under
the First Amendment will produce perfectly determinate outcomes, or
that it will produce the “right” outcome every time.  But by focusing on
exercises of government power that threaten free speech values, we think
our theory at a minimum directs the law’s attention to the substantive
issues at stake in the free speech/civil liability context, rather than asking
us to engage in metaphysical inquiries into the nature of state action or
general applicability.  Moreover, we believe that our theory fulfills the
three necessary criteria of any workable theory of the First Amendment:
producing relatively determinate outcomes, coherence, and fidelity to
First Amendment values.  We think we have shown that it satisfies these
criteria on its own terms and especially as compared to the existing ap-
proaches to this issue we discussed in Part II.
233. Solove & Schwartz, supra note 41, at 776–87. R
\\server05\productn\C\COL\109-7\COL702.txt unknown Seq: 58 26-OCT-09 12:12
2009] RETHINKING FREE SPEECH AND CIVIL LIABILITY 1707
At the level of practice, our theory has the benefit of resolving the
contested status of confidentiality rules under the conceptual confusion
of current law.  Under our approach, confidentiality rules to which the
government is not a party should in most cases be beyond First
Amendment scrutiny.
Current doctrine on free speech and civil liability is governed by two
opposing rules that are on a collision course.  Both the doctrine and its
underlying theory must be resolved to avoid a crash.  We hope we have
provided guidance regarding how to rethink free speech and civil liability
to place the issue on a more coherent conceptual foundation.
